Eliminating Double Talk from the Law of Double Jeopardy by Richardson, Eli J.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 4
Summer 1994
Eliminating Double Talk from the Law of Double
Jeopardy
Eli J. Richardson
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating Double Talk from the Law of Double Jeopardy, 22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 119 (1994) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol22/iss1/4
ELIMINATING DOUBLE-TALK FROM THE LAW OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
ELI J. RICHARDSON
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 121
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE Dixon .............. 124
A. The Blockburger Test ........................................... 126
B. Additional Protection Against Successive Prosecutions. 127
1. Ashe v. Swenson ........................................... 129
2. Harris v. Oklahoma ....................................... 130
3. Gradyv. Corbin ........................................... 132
4. In re N ielsen ................................................ 132
C. Special Double Jeopardy Rules Permitting Otherwise
Impermissible Successive Prosecutions ...................... 133
III. United States v. Dixon ................................................. 135
A . Facts ................................................................. 136
B. Supreme Court Opinions ....................................... 137
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE IN JEOPARDY: PROBLEMS
wrrIH THE SUPREME COURT'S METHODOLOGY ..................... 139
A. Ignoring the Requirement of Same Offenses .............. 139
B. Ignoring the Requirement that Jeopardies Be "'for" the
Sam e Offense ...................................................... 143
C. Misunderstanding the Crux of the Debate .................. 146
1. The Court's Decisions Have Not Turned on the
Definition of "Same Offense" ........................ 146
2. Misperceiving the Debate Over "Jeopardy" as a
Debate Over "Same Offense" ......................... 149
D. Mismatching Questions and Answers .............. 151
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM ............................................. 152
A. Identifying Multiple Jeopardies and Same Offenses:
Satisfying Textual Prerequisites for Double Jeopardy
P rotection .......................................................... 153
1. Identifying Multiple Jeopardies and Same
Offenses ...................................................... 153
2. Accounting for the Special Double Jeopardy
R ules .......................................................... 155
B. Ensuring that the Jeopardies Are "'for" the Same
Offense ............................................................. 157
120 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:119
C. Substituting the Due Process Clause for the Double
Jeopardy Clause as Guardian Against Certain Unfair
Successive Prosecutions ......................................... 159
1. Due Process Protection Against Successive Prose-
cutions: Substantive or Procedural? .................. 161
2. Substantive Due Process Protection Against Un-
fair Prosecutions ........................................... 163
VI. CONCLUSION .............................................................. 168
DOUBLE JEOPARD Y
ELIMINATING DOUBLE-TALK FROM THE LAW OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
ELI J. RICHARDSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution ("the Clause") provides, "[n]or shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb."' At first glance, the Clause does not appear to
be a particularly troublesome provision, as the language appears to
be conducive to easy interpretation. 2 Moreover, the concept of dou-
ble jeopardy dates back thousands of years and exists in some form
throughout the history of Western civilization.3 Indeed, the term
"double jeopardy" is sufficiently familiar to contemporary Ameri-
cans to make an occasional appearance in modern popular culture.4
A great deal of confusion, however, underlies this renowned, ap-
pealing, and seemingly self-explanatory constitutional guarantee.' In
* Associate, Rogers & Hardin, Atlanta, Georgia; J.D., 1992, Vanderbilt University;
B.S.E., 1989, Duke University. Author, Matching Tests for Double Jeopardy Violations with
Constitutional Interests, 45 VAND. L. REV. 273 (1992). The author wishes to thank John C.
Herman and David Bissinger for their helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
Copyright 1993. All rights reserved.
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. Although the text of the Clause refers only to injury to life or
limb, it applies to many kinds of punishments and prosecutions, most of which do not
threaten the defendant's "life" or "limb" as such. See infra text accompanying notes 7-9.
2. "Given the simplicity of its language and the simplicity of its animating force, the
interpretive history of the Double Jeopardy Clause perhaps should be a model of logical and
conceptual clarity. It is anything but that." Ronald J. Allen, Bard Ferrall & John Ratnas-
wamy, The Double Jeopardy Clause, Constitutional Interpretation and the Limits of Formal
Logic, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 273, 281 (1991)(further stating that the language of the Clause is
"beguilingly simple").
3. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969)(noting that every state recog-
nizes some prohibition against double jeopardy); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187
(1957)(stating that the prohibition of double jeopardy "is deeply ingrained in at least the An-
glo-American system of jurisprudence"); George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Succes-
sive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REV. 323, 325
n.9 (1986) [hereinafter Thomas, In Search of a Definition] (noting that the idea of double
jeopardy dates back to ancient Greek, Hebrew, and Roman law and exists today in European
and Asian nations).
4. See, e.g., Double Jeopardy (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 24, 1993)(a fictional ac-
count of a controversial murder prosecution).
5. As Justice Rehnquist noted, "the decisional law in [the double jeopardy] area is a
veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981); see also Allen, Ferrall & Ratnaswamy,
supra note 2 at 275.
1994]
122 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:119
particular, confusion results from the United States Supreme Court's
efforts to prescribe the scope of the Clause's protection of criminal
defendants against successive prosecutions.6 Although the Supreme
Court has succeeded in prescribing the scope of the Clause's protec-
tion of defendants regarding cumulative punishments, the justices of
the Court have sharply disagreed over the extent of the Clause's pro-
tection against successive prosecutions.'
In United States v. Dixon,' the Supreme Court attempted to clar-
ify the scope of the Clause. Regardless of the merits of the case's
holdings, Dixon illustrates the disagreement and confusion that has
prevented the formulation of a cohesive and logical double jeopardy
methodology.9 Thus, Dixon does not constitute reform in the double
jeopardy area, but rather demonstrates the continuing need for re-
form. This Article proposes a complete restructuring of the law of
double jeopardy, identifying the basic problems plaguing double
jeopardy jurisprudence' o and proposing a new methodology for ad-
dressing double jeopardy issues. I
The uncertainty that plagues double jeopardy jurisprudence results
from the Supreme Court's commission of several reasoning errors.
First, the Supreme Court has developed tests for double jeopardy
violations in successive prosecutions that simply ignore the obvious
threshold requirements for double jeopardy protection: two or more
jeopardies, and two or more "same" offenses. 2 The justices tend to
formulate tests capable of finding double jeopardy violations for
successive prosecutions even when the threshold requirements have
not been satisfied.
Second, the Supreme Court has ignored the potential significance
and distinctiveness of the word "for" in the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Consequently, the Court unknowingly has applied the
Clause whenever two jeopardies involve the same offense, even when
those jeopardies are not for the same offense." This pattern is un-
faithful to the language of the Clause, resulting in the Court's failure
6. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (revealing the confusion
surrounding the Clause's protection against successive prosecutions in five separate opinions,
each containing different reasoning and conclusions); see also infra note 101.
7. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
8. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
9. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text; infra notes 161-62 and accompanying
text; infra notes 26 and 75.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 118-66.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 167-230.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 118-29.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 130-40.
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to consider the governmental interests at stake in a given prosecu-
tion. 14
Third, in successive prosecution cases, the Supreme Court often
addresses issues and concerns different from those the Court pur-
ports to be addressing." As a result, the Court's resolution of the
ostensible double jeopardy issue often makes no sense. In particular,
the Supreme Court often portrays double jeopardy decisions as turn-
ing on whether two "same offenses" exist in the case, when in real-
ity, the Court's decision turns more on (1) the extent to which the
defendant has been "twice put in jeopardy," or (2) the extent to
which a second prosecution would be unfair to the defendant. ' 6
As a result of this treatment, the collection of double jeopardy
rules is difficult to apply. Furthermore, some of the individual rules
make no sense vis-a-vis the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Thus, the relationship between the various tests is unclear, compli-
cating a lower court's determination of the test or tests to be con-
sulted in resolving a specific double jeopardy claim.
To eliminate the problems caused both by majority holdings and
the reasoning of individual justices, this Article proposes a new
methodology for clarity and flexibility in double jeopardy jurispru-
dence. The proposed methodology involves a two-step inquiry to de-
termine whether cumulative punishments or successive prosecutions
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 17 In addition, in successive-
prosecution cases, a third step may be necessary to determine
whether the successive prosecutions violate the Due Process Clause."
The methodology's three steps are: (1) explicitly inquire whether
the defendant has been put in jeopardy more than once and whether
those jeopardies involved the same offense; (2) if so, determine
whether those jeopardies were both for that same offense; and (3) if
necessary, determine whether successive prosecutions violate sub-
stantive due process.
The methodology's double jeopardy inquiry comprises only steps
one and two; cumulative punishments and successive prosecutions vi-
olate the Double Jeopardy Clause, if at all, by virtue of these two
14. See infra text accompanying notes 186-97.
15. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 142-61.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 168-87.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (providing "nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."). See also infra text accompanying notes
188-230.
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steps. However, in successive prosecution cases, if successive prose-
cutions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the methodology
requires that a court proceed to step three. In this final step, the
court would determine whether the successive prosecutions are so un-
fair that they violate substantive due process even though they do
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This methodology does not itself indicate the amount of protec-
tion against successive prosecutions or cumulative punishments to
which defendants are entitled. Rather, the proposed methodology
sets forth the procedure which courts should use to determine the
level of protection existing against successive prosecutions and cu-
mulative punishments. In other words, the methodology prescribes
how to determine what protection exists, not what protection exists.
Under this methodology, courts could be fair to criminal defen-
dants, flexible in defining "jeopardy" and "same offense," sensitive
to governmental interests, and faithful to the language of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Lower courts could also resolve double jeopardy
questions far more easily by using the proposed methodology rather
than the confusing Supreme Court approach.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE Dixon
According to the Supreme Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause
generally 19 prohibits three occurrences: multiple (cumulative) 20 pun-
ishments for the same offense, subsequent prosecutions for an of-
fense after a conviction for the same offense, and subsequent
prosecutions for an offense after acquittal for the same offense. 2' To
paraphrase, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally prohibits a second
jeopardy-either a second punishment or a second prosecution-af-
ter a first jeopardy-either a prior punishment or a prior prosecu-
tion-for the same offense. 22 These three occurrences have two
19. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Clause always prohibits subsequent prose-
cutions for an offense after a conviction or acquittal for the same offense, and generally, but
not always, prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. See infra note 47.
20. As used in this Article, "cumulative" or "multiple" punishments refer to the imposi-
tion on a defendant of penalties that actually "add up," as opposed to penalties that coexist
in some sense but are not both actually "felt" by the defendant. For example, two consecutive
10-year prison sentences are cumulative or multiple punishments. On the other hand, two con-
current 10-year sentences are not cumulative or multiple punishments. Even though both con-
current sentences are actual punishments imposed on a defendant, they do not truly result in
punishment greater than a single 10-year sentence, because they both expire after 10 years.
21. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
22. Only part of this paraphrasing follows directly from the enunciation in North Caro-
lina v. Pearce of the Clause's three protections. This paraphrasing contemplates four permu-
tations. They are: a subsequent punishment for an offense after a prior prosecution for the
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things in common. First, they all involve multiple jeopardies-either
multiple prosecutions or multiple punishments. 3 Second, these mul-
tiple jeopardies all are for the same offense. Thus, according to the
language of the Clause and the Supreme Court's enunciation of the
scope of the Clause's protection, double jeopardy protection should
not exist unless (1) the defendant is subjected to multiple jeopardies,
and (2) those multiple jeopardies are for the same offense.24
To implement the protection contemplated by the Clause, the Su-
preme Court, before Dixon,25 had specified four or five2 situations
same offense, a subsequent prosecution after a prior punishment for the same offense, a sub-
sequent prosecution after a prior prosecution for the same offense, and a subsequent punish-
ment after a prior punishment for the same offense. Only the last two permutations
correspond precisely to one of the three protections. The first two permutations are not pro-
hibited explicitly by one of the three protections.
Justice Scalia assumes the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the first permutation, a subse-
quent punishment for an offense after a prior prosecution for an offense. In Dixon, Justice
White argued that under Justice Scalia's reasoning, the Clause would permit a subsequent
punishment, but not a subsequent prosecution, for simple assault after a prior prosecution for
simple assault. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2877-78 (1993)(White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia disagreed, stating that "[u]nder basic Blockbur-
ger analysis, [a defendant] may neither be tried a second time for [simple] assault nor again
convicted for [simple] assault .... Id. at 2859 n.7 (discussing Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932)). Justice Scalia misses the point, however, in stating that this follows
from Blockburger. Blockburger is nothing more than a definition of "same offense," see
infra text accompanying notes 39-41, having nothing to do with what protection the Double
Jeopardy Clause provides once "same offenses" are found to exist. Thus, Blockburger does
not answer whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a subsequent punishment-quite
apart from a subsequent prosecution-after a prior prosecution for the same offense.
Criminal defendants also are protected against the second permutation, a subsequent prose-
cution for an offense after a prior punishment for the same offense, albeit not salely by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. If a defendant was punished for an offense, then he necessarily was
prosecuted for that offense. Thus, a subsequent prosecution for an offense after a prior pun-
ishment for the same offense entails a second prosecution for an offense after a prior prosecu-
tion for that same offense. The second permutation, therefore, is the equivalent of the third
permutation, and thus corresponds to protection available under North Carolina v. Pearce.
23. Multiple punishments do not necessarily entail multiple prosecutions. Unless prohib-
ited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant can be subjected to multiple punishments
without being subjected to multiple prosecutions, because a court can inflict multiple punish-
ments on a defendant in the course of a single prosecution. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359 (1983).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (suggesting both of these prerequisites to a double jeopardy
violation); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.
25. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
26. A debate rages in the Supreme Court over whether one of the tests, which originated
in In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889), is properly considered a fifth test, or whether the test
merely duplicates protection already provided by one of the four other tests.
In Dixon, Justice Souter argued that Nielsen provides a conceptually distinct test for double
jeopardy violations. According to Justice Souter, Nielsen held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars prosecution for a single act included in a continuing offense-an offense compris-
ing a series of acts-after conviction for the continuing offense. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2885
1994]
126 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:119
in which the Clause is violated. Before Dixon, the Court would de-
termine whether any of the double jeopardy situations existed. If so,
the Double Jeopardy Clause shielded the defendant from the second
jeopardy. If not, the Clause did not shield the defendant, and the
second jeopardy was permissible. These tests, hereinafter referred to
as the "affirmative tests,"' 27 may be referred to as Blockburger2s,
Ashe29, Harris"', Grady3' and Nielsen.32
A. The Blockburger Test
The test having the broadest applicability is known as the Block-
burger test 33 and focuses strictly on the legal elements of the crimes
charged in the first and second jeopardies.34 Under the Blockburger
test, when the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
different penal statutes, the offenses are not the same if each statute
requires proof of a fact that the other does not.35 By negative impli-
cation, both offenses are the same unless each statute requires proof
of a fact that the other does not. 36 In Brown v. Ohio, 37 the Supreme
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, in Justice Souter's view, Nielsen
provided a test for double jeopardy violations distinct from any other test. Id. at 2885-86.
Justice Scalia disagreed, stating that "Nielsen simply applies the common proposition, en-
tirely in accord with Blockburger, that prosecution for a greater offense (cohabitation, de-
fined to require proof of adultery) bars prosecution for a lesser included offense (adultery)."
Id. at 2860.
Clearly, much confusion surrounds the role of Nielsen in double jeopardy jurisprudence.
See Eli J. Richardson, Matching Tests for Double Jeopardy Violations with Constitutional
Interests, 45 VAND. L. REv. 273, 2"95 n.154-55 (1992) [hereinafter Richardson]. However, in
light of Justice Scalia's remarks in Dixon, the Supreme Court has not accepted Nielsen as a
fifth test for double jeopardy violations.
27. The author calls these tests the "affirmative tests" because they are the only tests by
which a court can affirm the existence of a double jeopardy violation. By contrast, other tests,
hereinafter called "special" rules or tests, can reverse a finding of a double jeopardy violation
indicated by an affirmative test. See infra text accompanying notes 80-89. These other rules
are not "affirmative," because they can only negate, not affirm, the existence l'f a double
jeopardy violation.
28. See supra note 22.
29. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
30. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
31. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
32. In re Nielson, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
33. Although this test is named for Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),
the Supreme Court adopted the test in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911).
34. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
35. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
36. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (statutory offenses are the same if it is "not the case that
'each [statute] requires proof of a fact which the other does not."') (quoting Blockburger, 284
U.S. at 304); Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (prohibiting successive prosecutions as well as cumula-
tive punishment under two separate statutes "[ulnless 'each statute requires proof of an addi-
tional fact which the other does not."') (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433,
434 (1871)).
37. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
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Court identified a clear example of a double jeopardy violation un-
der Blockburger. Based on a simple application of Blockburger, the
Court in Brown held that the Clause prohibits the successive prose-
cution of a greater offense and a lesser-included offense.3" This is
logical because, by definition, conviction of the lesser offense re-
quires no proof beyond that which is necessary for conviction of the
greater offense."
By itself, Blockburger does not inform a court whether a double
jeopardy violation exists. Blockburger is phrased not as a test of
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated, but rather as a test
of whether the crimes involved in the first and second jeopardies are
for the "same offense." If the Blockburger test indicates that the
same offenses are involved in the first and second jeopardies, the
second jeopardy might violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 40 The
Blockburger test for "same offenses," however, cannot by itself an-
swer the ultimate question of whether a double jeopardy violation
exists. Even if the case involves "same offenses" according to Block-
burger, a double jeopardy violation might not exist because other
considerations might turn what otherwise would be a double jeop-
ardy violation into a nonviolation. 41 Although Blockburger enables a
court to determine whether the defendant's two jeopardies involved
the "same offense," the Court cannot use Blockburger to determine
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the second jeopardy.
B. Additional Protection Against Successive Prosecutions
The Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence is much more
complicated in successive prosecutions than in cumulative punish-
ments. In the latter context, Blockburger is the only applicable test
for double jeopardy violations. 42 By contrast, in successive prosecu-
38. Id. at 168.
39. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-09 (1980).
40. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (stating that under Blockburger, "[ulnless each statute
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits successive prosecutions as well as cumulative punishment.")(citation omitted).
41. For example, suppose a defendant is tried for first-degree murder, but the trial ends
in a mistrial at the defendant's request. If the state forces the defendant to stand trial a second
time for first-degree murder, under Blockburger the defendant would be subject to a second
trial for the same offense. Despite the existence of "sare offenses" under Blockburger, how-
ever, the second trial generally would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the Supreme
Court has held. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)(holding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause prohibits a retrial following a defense-requested mistrial only if the defendant can
show that the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into requesting a mistrial).
42. Even supporters of broad double jeopardy rights acknowledge that Blockburger is the
exclusive test for double jeopardy violations in the cumulative-punishment context. See Grady
v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 517 n.8 (1990).
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tions the Supreme Court has strayed further from the language of
the Clause and created several additional tests for double jeopardy
violations. Not surprisingly, the justices have been far more divided
over the scope of the Clause as it relates to successive prosecutions.
Blockburger is one of several tests the Supreme Court formulated
to determine whether successive prosecutions violate the Clause.
Blockbutger generally"l bars successive prosecutions to the same ex-
tent that it bars cumulative punishments." Although Blockburger is
the only test a court can apply to find that cumulative punishments
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court has created
three or four45 additional tests applicable only in successive prosecu-
tions. A defendant can invoke the additional tests to show that suc-
cessive prosecutions, but not cumulative punishments, violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 6
The Supreme Court's rationale for creating these extra safeguards
against successive prosecutions is clear: more significant constitu-
tional interests are at stake in successive prosecutions than in cumu-
lative punishments. The Supreme Court has declared that the sole
purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the context of cumulative
punishments is to ensure that a court imposes no more punishment
on a defendant than the legislature intended. 47 In other words, in this
43. Although Blockburger without exception prohibits successive prosecutions for the
same offense, Blockburger does not always prohibit cumulative punishments for the same
offense. Somewhat obliquely, the Supreme Court has declared that in the context of cumula-
tive punishments, but not successive prosecutions, Blockburger is a mere rule of statutory
construction: The legislature is presumed not to have intended to punish a person twice for
offenses which are the "same" under Blockburger. If the prosecution can rebut this presump-
tion, however, cumulative punishments, even for offenses deemed the "same" under Block-
burger, are permissible. See infra note 47.
44. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 166.
45. Four additional tests exist if In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889), truly provides an
additional source of double jeopardy protection not available under any other test. Only three
additional tests exist, however, if Nielsen merely reiterates protection available under one or
more of the other tests. Whether Nielsen in fact provides a separate source of protection, and
thus constitutes a fourth additional test, is a matter of sharp debate. See supra note 26.
46. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 529 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). As a corollary, if the legislature de-
monstrably intended that a defendant be punished under two different statutory offenses,
then the Clause permits the imposition of cumulative punishments under both statutes, even if
both statutes punish the "same" offense. See id. at 368.
The Supreme Court has applied this separation of powers principle whether the legislature
involved is Congress and the court is a federal court, or whether a state legislature and a state
court are involved. If the Double Jeopardy Clause, in the context of cumulative punishments,
truly does no more than prevent a court from imposing more punishment than the legislature
intended, it is arguable whether federal constitutional concerns exist when cumulative punish-
ments are imposed in the course of a single state proceeding. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note
26, at 309-11 (arguing that defendants should not receive double jeopardy protection in the
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
context the Clause is not intended to protect individual rights, but
rather to uphold the separation of powers principle that legislatures,
not courts, authorize punishment. 4 The Supreme Court's view has
been that cumulative punishments, whether or not for the same of-
fense, do not truly implicate concerns involving a criminal defen-
dant's rights.4 9
By contrast, the Clause is an extensive and significant safeguard of
individual rights in the context of successive prosecutions. In partic-
ular, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the government from
both harassing defendants with repeated prosecutions and rehearsing
the case presentation at one trial in preparation for a subsequent
trial.5 0 In addition, the Clause protects criminal defendants from the
embarrassment, expense, uncertainty, and anxiety caused by succes-
sive prosecutions." To implement such protection, the Supreme
Court has supplemented Blockburger's protection against successive
prosecutions. Unfortunately, the additional protection has developed
into an incoherent collection of unrelated tests for double jeopardy
violations.
1. Ashe v. Swenson
One such test emerged in Ashe v. Swenson,5 2 where the Supreme
Court purported to hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause embodies
the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal cases (criminal collat-
eral estoppel), meaning that once an issue of ultimate53 fact has been
context of cumulative punishments imposed in a single state proceeding if federal constitu-
tional interests in cumulative punishments are truly limited to federal separation of powers
concerns).
48. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 695 (1980).
49. Contra Hunfer, 459 U.S. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(arguing that cumulative
punishments implicate legitimate concerns regarding criminal defendants' rights).
50. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 518.
51. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
52. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
53. The Court in Aslie defined collateral estoppel in terms of "ultimate" issues. Id. at
442. This may have been imprecise, however. The Supreme Court and other federal courts
since have held or stated that collateral estoppel applies to "necessary" (also known as "es-
sential") issues. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984); Synanon Church v.
United States, 820 F.2d 421, 426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
When used precisely, the terms "ultimate" and "necessary" have different meanings, and
this distinction can be significant. Strictly speaking, an "ultimate" issue bears on facts that
necessarily must be found for the court to impose obligations or sanctions. See The Ever-
greens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). "Neces-
sary" issues are those issues "actually recognized by the parties as important and by the trier
of fact as necessary to the first judgment." Synanon Church, 820 F.2d at 427 (citing RaSTATE-
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decided by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot be relitigated
between the same parties . 4 In reality, however, the Ashe Court's
holding is probably misstated. Ashe presumably incorporated only
one side of collateral estoppel into the Double Jeopardy Clause. Be-
cause a criminal defendant is the only proper recipient of double
jeopardy rights, Ashe doubtless requires only that the defendant re-
ceive the benefits of collateral estoppel. 5 Thus, the upshot of Ashe is
that if an ultimate issue is decided in favor of a defendant against the
prosecution, no prosecuting authority in the same jurisdiction may
relitigate that issue against the same defendant.16
2. Harris v. Oklahoma
The Supreme Court established another test in Harris v. Okla-
homa.5 7 In Harris, the defendant was convicted of felony murder
based on a homicide committed during an armed robbery, and the
State subsequently sought to prosecute the defendant for the armed
robbery. 58 Blockburger did not prohibit the second prosecution be-
cause felony murder required proof of something-a homicide-that
armed robbery did not, and armed robbery required proof of some-
thing-an armed robbery-that felony murder did not. 9 However,
the Supreme Court held that when a conviction of a greater crime
cannot be had without proving6° the lesser crime, the Double Jeop-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. j (1973)).
Thus, when a criminal case turns upon whether the defendant has a valid alibi defense, the
veracity of the defendant's alibi is a necessary issue but not an ultimate issue. The issue is
necessary because the parties and the trier of fact recognize that it is important and necessary
to the judgment. It is not ultimate, however, because it does not directly bear on the existence
of the statutory elements of the crime charged-the only facts that necessarily must be found
for the court to impose sanctions.
54. 397 U.S. at 443.
55. That the Doutle Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution to receive the benefits of
collateral estoppel is an interpretation that cannot be taken seriously.
56. See id. at 446 (stating that the true issue in Ashe is whether the state could force the
defendant to relitigate an issue on which the defendant had previously prevailed).
Collateral estoppel would not prohibit a prosecuting authority in a different jurisdiction
from relitigating the issue against the same defendant. A prosecuting authority in a different
jurisdiction was not the party against whom the issue was decided the first time the issue was
litigated. Thus, collateral estoppel would be inapplicable, because it bars relitigation of an
issue only between the same parties involved in the first litigation of the issue.
57. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
58. Id.
59. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 520 (1990).
60. The Harris Court actually stated: "When, as here, conviction of a greater crime,
murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one."
433 U.S. at 682. However, apparently the Court was actually referring to conviction of the
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ardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of
the greater crime. 61
Far from being revolutionary, Harris is merely a safeguard against
an unconscionable, albeit unintended, legislative evisceration of
Blockburger's protection against successive prosecutions. In Harris,
Blockburger did not bar the subsequent prosecution for the lesser
offense after conviction of the greater offense, because felony mur-
der did not require proof of the lesser offense of armed robbery; the
prosecution proved armed robbery, but proof of any felony would
have sufficed to prove felony murder.6 2 This was true, though, only
because the state legislature, for the sake of convenience, had
lumped all felonies into a single felony murder statute rather than
creating a separate murder statute for each felony. In other words, if
the prosecution in Harris had not been able to rely on a single statute
outlawing murder during the commission of any felony, but rather
had to use a separate statute specifically outlawing murder in the
commission of armed robbery, Blockburger would have barred the
second prosecution. Thus, Blockburger failed to protect the defen-
dant merely because the Oklahoma Legislature had found it conven-
ient to use an all-inclusive felony murder statute to deal with all
murders committed during felonies. Thus, without a special rule ad-
dressing this situation, a defendant would lose the protection that
Blockburger contemplates. Harris does no more than prevent such
an unfair result.
In fact, Harris is merely a prohibition of successive prosecutions
for a greater and lesser-included offense .6 As evidenced by Brown v.
Ohio,M such a prohibition usually occurs pursuant to the application
of Blockburger.6 Indeed, the only situation in which Harris provides
protection not already available under Blockburger is when a statu-
tory offense expressly incorporates another statutory offense without
greater crime without proving the lesser crime, rather than conviction of the greater crime
without conviction of the lesser crime. In Harris, the defendant was convicted in the first trial
only of the greater offense; he was neither charged with nor convicted of the lesser offense at
the first trial. Id. Thus, conviction of the greater crime could be and was had without convic-
tion of the lesser crime. However, conviction of the greater crime was not, and could not have
been, obtained without proof sufficient to have convicted defendant of the lesser offense.
Thus, contrary to its language, the rule of Harris actually is that when conviction of a greater
crime cannot be had without proof sufficient for a conviction of the lesser crime, the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater crime.
61. Id.
62. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Harris, 433 U.S. at 682.
64. 432 U.S. 131 (1977).
65. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 787 (1985).
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specifying the latter's elements. 66 Thus, Harris simply closes a loop-
hole in the established rule prohibiting successive prosecutions for a
greater and lesser-included offense. To this extent, Harris is consis-
tent with, and in fact a corollary to, Blockburger.6 7
3. Grady v. Corbin
The most recent test originated in Grady v. Corbin.6s In Grady,
the Supreme Court, after reaffirming the other double jeopardy
tests, 69 held that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent
prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense
charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted. "70
4. In re Nielsen
Arguably, a fourth test is applicable in the successive prosecutions
context. This test, which originated in In -re Nielsen,71 is responsible
for much of the confusion regarding double jeopardy jurisprudence.
In Nielsen, the defendant was first convicted of cohabiting with two
wives, then was prosecuted and convicted for committing adultery
with one of the wives during the three-year period of cohabitation. 72
The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
adultery prosecution 73 on the grounds that a person convicted for a
crime containing various "incidents" cannot be tried again for one
of those "incidents. 74
Supreme Court justices and commentators alike have disagreed
over the meaning of Nielsen's holding, and consequently have disa-
greed over Nielsen's place in double jeopardy analysis. First, disa-
greement exists as to whether "incident," as used in Nielsen, means
66. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2886 (1993)(Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
68. Grady, 495 U.S. at 508.
69. Id. at 516-21.
70. Id. at 510.
71. 131 U.S. 176(1889).
72. Id. The government's cohabitation indictment listed May 13, 1888 as the end of the
cohabitation period, while the adultery indictment listed May 14, 1888 as the date of the adul-
tery. The Supreme Court held, however, that the cohabitation indictment actually alleged co-
habitation continuing until the indictment was returned in September of 1888. Id. at 177.
73. Id. at 187.
74. Id. at 188-89.
DOUBLE JEOPARD Y
"statutory element" or whether it means "act."" If incident means
"statutory element," Nielsen merely states the corollary to Block-
burger,76 that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecu-
tions for a greater and a lesser-included offense." Under this
interpretation, a court need never consider Nielsen separately, be-
cause Blockburger provides the same protection as Nielsen. If "inci-
dent" means "act," however, then Nielsen bars prosecution for a
single act after conviction for a continuous offense-defined to in-
clude a series of acts-including that single act. 78 Under this interpre-
tation, Nielsen is a discrete fifth source of protection that a court
must consider in adjudicating double jeopardy claims.
Nielsen is indicative of the problems the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to successive prosecutions has created for lower courts. The
Court has developed a haphazard collection of narrowly applicable
tests for double jeopardy violations. In adjudicating double jeopardy
claims, lower courts have been left to sift through these tests and
guess at which ones apply and which ones overlap. As discussed be-
low in Section IV, some of these tests are not only functionally cum-
bersome, but are also substantively deficient, making little sense vis-
a-vis each other and the language of the Clause.79
C. Special Double Jeopardy Rules Permitting Otherwise
Impermissible Successive Prosecutions
Even if a double jeopardy violation otherwise exists under the af-
firmative tests, a double jeopardy violation will not be found under
some circumstances. The Supreme Court has created several special
rules which can preclude a finding of double jeopardy even when one
or more affirmative tests indicate a double jeopardy violation.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause generally does not bar a defendant's retrial when the
first trial for the same crime ended in a mistrial at the defendant's
request.80 Similarly, if a first trial ended in a mistrial over the defen-
75. Compare United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2861 n.10 (1993)("incident" was
intended to refer to an "element" of a criminal statute) with id. at 2885-86 n.5 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(" incident" was intended to mean "act").
76. See id. at 2886 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Having concluded that "incident" meant "element," Justice Scalia stated, "Nielsen
simply applies the common proposition, entirely in accord with Blockburger, that prosecution
for a greater offense (cohabitation, defined to require proof of adultery) bars prosecution for
a lesser included offense (adultery)." Id. at 2860.
78. Id. at 2885 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 118-61.
80. See supra note 39.
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dant's objection, the Clause does not prohibit a retrial if the prose-
cution can show that the mistrial was a "manifest necessity."', A
third special rule is the "dual sovereign" rule, first announced in
United States v. Lanza.a Under the dual sovereign rule, the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit successive prosecutions under
state and then federal law, or vice versa, even if the successive prose-
cutions would be impermissible if brought both under state law or
both under federal law.83
Each of these rules can reverse an apparent finding of a double
jeopardy violation reached under every affirmative test except
Ashe.14 In other words, even if a double jeopardy violation exists
under any affirmative test except Ashe, the special rules can result in
a finding of no violation. Even if two offenses are the same under
Blockburger, they conceivably can be prosecuted successively, or
punished cumulatively, by virtue of the special rules.8 5 Even if two
offenses are greater and lesser-included offenses under Harris, the
special rules conceivably can permit successive prosecutions. 6 Even
81. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) (quoting Winsor v. The
Queen, L.R. 1 Q.B. 289, 305 (1866) (Cockburn, C.J.)).
82. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
83. "[A]n act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense
against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each." Id. at 382.
84. The special rules never apply in situations where Ashe indicates a double jeopardy
violation. A double jeopardy violation occurs under Ashe when a sovereign forces a criminal
defendant to relitigate an issue that previously was decided in defendant's favor in a prosecu-
tion (brought by the same sovereign) that ended in a valid and final judgment. See Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
Thus, a double jeopardy violation under Ashe does not occur unless the first trial ends in a
valid and final judgment. A mistrial, however, does not effect a valid and final judgment.
Therefore, the special rules sometimes permitting retrial after a mistrial would not be applica-
ble when Ashe indicates a double jeopardy violation.
Nor would the dual sovereign rule apply. A double jeopardy violation under Ashe does not
occur unless the first and second prosecutions are both brought by the same sovereign. Suc-
cessive prosecutions brought by the state and then the United States, or vice versa, are not
brought both by the same sovereign, and thus no double jeopardy violation could occur under
Ashe.
85. If the crime charged in the retrial requires no proof beyond that which was required
to prove the crime charged in the original trial, application of BMockburger results in a finding
of same offenses. This fosters the appearance that a double jeopardy violation has occurred.
Due to the special rules permitting a retrial after an original trial, however, a double jeopardy
violation may not have occurred.
In addition, although the Double Jeopardy Clause ordinarily prohibits cumulative punish-
ments for the same offense, another special rule permits cumulative punishments for offenses
deemed the "same" under Blockburger, as long as the legislature intended that the offenses
be punished cumulatively. See supra notes 43 and 47. Thus, this special rule can reverse what
otherwise would be a double jeopardy violation in cumulative punishments.
86. If felony murder (based on armed robbery) is charged at the original trial, and armed
robbery is charged on retrial, then successive prosecutions for a greater and lesser-included
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if Grady bars a second prosecution, the special rules might permit
the second prosecution. 87 Similarly, even if Nielsen otherwise prohib-
its a second prosecution, it might be permitted under the special
rules. 8
The affirmative tests for double jeopardy violations, therefore, do
not necessarily resolve the ultimate question of whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause has been violated. Instead, the special rules ulti-
mately might decide the double jeopardy claim. Thus, courts must
keep in mind not only the numerous affirmative tests, but also the
special rules. Lower courts are faced with an imposing number of
disjointed rules, any one of which could conceivably govern the ulti-
mate resolution of the defendant's double jeopardy claim. Working
with such haphazard and random rules of inscrutable origin is ex-
tremely difficult.
Surely a court's task would be greatly simplified if double jeop-
ardy rules were presented in a manageable framework with a logical
and cohesive methodology that takes into account all of the protec-
tion and policy. considerations underlying the current rules, yet en-
sures that each rule is explainable by the language of the Clause.
Such a methodology is presented in Section V below.8 9
III. UNITED STATES V. DIXON
In United States v. Dixon,90 a divided Supreme Court effected two
changes in the law of double jeopardy. First, the Court overruled
Grady v. Corbin, which held that the Clause bars a subsequent pros-
offense have occurred. In this situation, a double jeopardy violation seemingly has occurred
under Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
Due to the special rules permitting a retrial after an original trial, however, a double jeopardy
violation may not have occurred.
87. If the prosecution, at the defendant's retrial, will prove conduct constituting an of-
fense for which the defendant was prosecuted at the original trial, Grady seemingly signals a
double jeopardy violation. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 519 (1990). However, under the
special rules permitting retrial after a mistrial, the retrial might not result in a double jeopardy
violation, notwithstanding Grady.
88. Nielsen held that a person convicted for a crime containing various incidents cannot
be tried again for one of those incidents. In re Nielson, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889). Nielsen
presumably prohibits a defendant's retrial for an incident after previously being prosecuted
for a crime containing that incident, whether or not the first prosecution resulted in a convic-
tion, since the existence of double jeopardy protection generally does not depend on whether
the defendant won or lost in the first jeopardy. Assuming this to be true, if there is a mistrial,
Nielsen seemingly prohibits a retrial if the second trial involves an incident contained in the
first trial. Due to the special rules permitting retrial after mistrial, however, the retrial might
be permissible notwithstanding Nielsen.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 167-230.
90. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
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ecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in
that prosecution, the government will prove conduct constituting an
offense for which the defendant already has been prosecuted. 9' Sec-
ond, Dixon created, or at least confirmed, a source of limited protec-
tion against successive prosecutions. 92 The justice's divergent
reasoning, displayed in the various Dixon opinions, exemplifies sev-
eral of the problems plaguing double jeopardy jurisprudence.
A. Facts
In Dixon, the Supreme Court faced the consolidated appeal of two
cases. In one case, respondent Dixon was arrested for second- degree
murder, then released on bond. 93 As permitted by statute, 94 the court
placed several conditions on Dixon's release, with the understanding
that violation of any condition would subject him to prosecution for
contempt of court. 9 One of the conditions was that Dixon not com-
mit a criminal offense. 96
While on release awaiting trial, Dixon was arrested and indicted
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of a
District of Columbia statute.97 A hearing was held allowing Dixon to
show why he should not be held in contempt for violating the condi-
tions of his release. After the hearing, the court concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that Dixon had violated the statute outlawing pos-
session with intent to distribute. 9 The court found Dixon guilty of
contempt for violating the court's pretrial release order, and sen-
tenced him to 180 days in jail. Dixon moved to dismiss, on double
jeopardy grounds, the pending indictment charging him with posses-
sion with intent to distribute.9 The trial court granted Dixon's mo-
tion. ' *
In the second case, the respondent's wife obtained a civil protec-
tion order (CPO) ordering respondent Foster to refrain from assault-
ing, threatening, or abusing her in any manner.'0' Foster was
91. Id. at 2860.
92. See infro note 114 and accompanying text.
93. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853.
94. The trial court was authorized to impose any condition of release that would "rea-
sonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or the safety of any other person or the
community .... " D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989).
95. 113 S. Ct. at 2853.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2853-54.
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subsequently charged with criminal contempt for violating the CPO,
based in part on three alleged episodes of threatening and two al-
leged episodes of assaulting his wife. 0 2 After a hearing, the court
found Foster guilty of both counts of contempt arising out of the
assaults, but acquitted him from the three counts based on threaten-
ing. 103
The Government'04 then indicted Foster on five counts, each based
on one of the five relevant episodes at issue in the contempt proceed-
ing. Foster was charged with three counts of threatening to injure
another, each count based on one of the threatening episodes at issue
in the contempt proceeding. In addition, Foster was charged with
simple assault based on one of the assault episodes underlying the
prior contempt prosecution. Finally, Foster was charged with assault
with intent to kill based on the other assault episode at issue in the
contempt proceeding. 0 5 Foster's motion to dismiss all five counts on
double jeopardy grounds was denied bv the trial court.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals consolidated Foster's
case with Dixon's and held that, under Grady, the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibited all counts of the pending prosecutions of both
Dixon and Foster. 10
B. Supreme Court Opinions
In a dizzying array of opinions, 07 the Supreme Court affirmed in
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The U.S. Attorney's Office obtained the indictment against Foster. Usually, a federal
indictment after a prior criminal contempt conviction in local court would not raise double
jeopardy concerns. Local and federal authorities usually represent different sovereigns-a
state and the United States- thus rendering the Double Jeopardy Clause inapplicable to their
successive prosecutions. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. In Dixon, however, both
cases transpired in Washington, D.C. The local authorities were federal authorities, meaning
that both cases involved a single sovereign, the United States.
105. Id. at 2854.
106. Id.
107. Five separate opinions were filed. Justice Scalia filed an opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court. Only Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's opinion in all respects,
but Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas joined with that part of
the opinion overruling Grady. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion, in which Justice
O'Connor and Justice Thomas joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed that Grady should be overruled, but disagreed with the judgment of the
Court that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited all of Dixon's indictment and the simple
assault count of Foster's indictment. United-States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2865 (1993).
Justice White filed an opinion, joined entirely by Justice Stevens and in part by Justice
Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice White agreed that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause barred Dixon's indictment and the simple assault charge of Foster's indictment,
but felt that the remaining counts of Foster's indictment should also have been dismissed on
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part and reversed in part.'°0 The Court upheld the dismissal of Dix-
on's indictment on double jeopardy grounds.'°9 In Foster's case, the
Court also upheld the dismissal of the simple assault charge on dou-
ble jeopardy grounds. 10 With respect to the count of assault with
intent to kill and the three counts of threatening to injure another,
however, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause did not bar Foster's prosecution. I'
Although several aspects of the various opinions provide insight
into the problems with the Supreme Court's current double jeopardy
methodology, and thus merit discussion elsewhere in this Article,
Dixon needs to be dissected to identify the case's holdings. Of
course, one identifiable "holding" of Dixon is the Court's judgment
that based on the specific facts of Dixon's case, the Double Jeopardy
Clause barred his pending prosecution; and that based on the spe-
cific facts of Foster's case, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Fos-
ter's pending prosecution for simple assault but not for the other
charges. This holding is not easily translated into a black-letter rule
applicable in future cases, however, because the case produced nei-
double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 2868-69. Justice White's opinion, in essence, set forth three
arguments. First, in a part joined by Justice Souter, Justice White argued that neither the fact
that criminal contempt and the underlying offenses violate different governmental interests,
nor the fact that judicial and prosecutorial administration might suffer if successive prosecu-
tions for both are not allowed, changes the result that successive prosecutions for both violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. In the second part of the opinion, Justice White argued that
the Clause barred all counts in Foster's indictment, because every count was the same as an
offense "at issue" in the criminal contempt proceeding. Id. at 2874. Finally, Justice White
argued that Grady should not have been at issue in the case because the Court should have
prohibited the indictments against both respondents under Blockburger. Id. at 2876. Moreo-
ver, Justice White argued that once in the case, Grady should not have been overruled. Id. at
2879.
Justice Blackmun also filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at
2879. He argued that because punishment for criminal contempt serves a different purpose
than punishment for the underlying crime, criminal contempt and the underlying crime are
not the same offense, meaning that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit the pending
prosecution of Dixon or Foster. Id. at 2880. Justice Blackmun, however, also stated that the
Court should not have overruled Grady. Id.
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, also wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Id. at 2881. Justice Souter agreed that Dixon's indictment and the simple
assault count of Foster's irrdictment should be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, but felt
that the remaining counts of Foster's indictment also should have been dismissed. Id. Justice
Souter asserted that the Supreme Court had consistently recognized that, owing to the special
burdens posed by successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause provides broader pro-
tection in successive prosecutions than in cumulative punishments. Id. He also argued that the
Court should not have overruled Grady. Id.
108. Id. at 2864.
109. ld. at 2858.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 2858-59.
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ther a majority opinion, "2 nor a consensus as to how the judgment
was reached. Thus, Dixon's precedential value is limited to its facts.
Nonetheless, Dixon probably does establish an articulable prece-
dential rule: The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a prosecution for
an alleged violation of a criminal statute after a prior prosecution
for criminal contempt based on a violation of a court order com-
manding the defendant not to violate that criminal statute."3 It is
unclear whether the rule provides protection previously nonexistent
under the affirmative tests or merely illustrates a special application
of the protection already existing under Harris."14
The other holding of Dixon is both more apparent and more sig-
nificant. By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court expressly over-
ruled Grady."5 A detailed discussion of the justices' arguments for
overruling Grady is beyond the scope of this Article. However, as set
forth below,"16 Grady was marked by many analytical deficiencies,
and therefore was an impediment to achieving a logical and cohesive
double jeopardy methodology."17 Thus, the overruling of Grady con-
stitutes progress in the double jeopardy area.
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE IN JEOPARDY: PROBLEMS
WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S METHODOLOGY
A. Ignoring the Requirement of Same Offenses
As noted above,"' Ashe and Grady constitute the only safeguards
against successive prosecutions which unquestionably are qualita-
tively distinct from Blockburger."9 Scrutiny of Ashe and Grady re-
112. Four justices joined part of Justice Scalia's opinion to form a majority to overrule
Grady, but no majority opinion emerged detailing why the Double Jeopardy Clause did or did
not prohibit the prosecutions for the crimes at issue. See supra note 107.
113. This follows from the narrowest reading of the facts of Dixon.
114. Compare United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2857 (1993) Wiih id. at 2867-68
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Thomas joined Justice
Scalia to overrule Grady. See supra note 107.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 125-29.
117. See infra text following note 129.
118. See supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
119. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), and In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889), are
additional sources of protection against successive prosecutions. However, Harris merely
closes an unacceptable loophole in Blockburger's prohibition of successive prosecutions for
greater and lesser-included offenses. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59. In addition,
disagreement exists as to whether Nielsen provides a qualitatively different kind of protection
than tilockburger, or is merely an alternative articulation of Blockburger's prohibition of stic-
cessive prosecutions for a greater and lesser-included offense. See supra note 26.
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veals a curious fact: Under both tests, a double jeopardy violation
can occur even when the first and second jeopardies do not involve
what could reasonably be called the "same offense."
Under Ashe, a double jeopardy violation occurs only when, in a
subsequent prosecution, a court fails to invoke the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel to prevent relitigation of an ultimate issue against a de-
fendant who prevailed against the same sovereign on the same issue
in a previous prosecution.'20 To determine whether Ashe abandons
the requirement of a same offense, the following question must be
answered: Does the fact that a court failed to apply collateral estop-
pel necessarily mean that the offenses involved in the first and the
second jeopardies are the same? If the answer is no, the inescapable
conclusion is that Ashe does not require two jeopardies involving the
same offense.
Analytically, the first step in answering this question is to deter-
mine what is the same in the first and second prosecution.' 2' The
obvious answer is that the issue is the same.'2 However, to the extent
that sameness of issues does not entail sameness of offenses, collat-
eral estoppel is irrelevant to whether the offenses involved in both
prosecutions are the same. In fact, collateral estoppel can bar reliti-
gation of an issue in a second prosecution identical to an issue de-
cided in a first prosecution, even when the issue is unquestionably
irrelevant to any offense.
For example, suppose the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania prose-
cutes a defendant for armed robbery. Suppose further that the only
disputed issue in the case was the identity of the perpetrator, that
numerous witnesses positively identified the defendant as the robber,
and that her fingerprints are positively identified on the robbery
weapon. Imagine that the defendant mounts an alibi defense, offer-
ing overwhelming proof that, notwithstanding the prosecution's
proof, she was in Hawaii at the time of the robbery. If the jury were
to acquit the defendant, it likely would do so because the defendant
was in Hawaii at the time of the armed robbery.
Pennsylvania then brings a second prosecution against the defen-
dant, this time for an aggravated assault which occurred one hour
120. In Ashe, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that a criminal
defendant receive the benefits of collateral estoppel. Supra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text. When a court improperly fails to apply collateral estoppel, the Double Jeopardy Clause
is violated.
121. See generally infra note 128.
122. A court should apply collateral estoppel only when the same issue that could be
raised in a second prosecution was already litigated in a prior prosecution. This means that
the application of collateral estoppel requires that the same issue be present in two consecutive
jeopardies.
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after the armed robbery, fifty miles from the site of the armed rob-
bery. To convict the defendant, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant was present at the murder scene. To do so, it would have
to relitigate whether defendant was in Hawaii at the time of the mur-
der. Such relitigation, however, is impermissible under Ashe.'23
In this hypothetical, the similarity in the first and second prosecu-
tion is the issue of whether defendant was in Hawaii at the time in
question. However, the issue relates to a fact-being in Hawaii-that
has nothing to do with anything reasonably labeled as an "offense."
Thus, even if the Hawaii issues are the same, they do not relate to
offenses that are the same. Therefore, "same issue" should not
translate into "same offense." Thus, under Ashe, a double jeopardy
violation can occur even when it cannot reasonably be claimed that
the "same offense" was involved in both prosecutions. 124
123. Actually, the relitigation of the issue presented in this hypothetical is prohibited only
under one of two competing versions of collateral estoppel. Federal courts disagree over the
kinds of issues that will trigger collateral estoppel. See Syanon Church v. United States, 820
F.2d 421, 426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Some courts hold that collateral estoppel bars only "ulti-
mate" issues, which are issues involving facts that necessarily must be found for the court to
impose sanctions or obligations. See Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). For example, in a criminal trial the only ultimate issues are
the existence or nonexistence of each statutory element of the crimes charged; whether the
court can impose criminal punishment on the defendant depends entirely on the existence or
nonexistence of each statutory element.
Other courts have adopted a broader version of collateral estoppel, holding that collateral
estoppel applies to "necessary" (also known as "essential") issues. Necessary issues are those
issues "'actually recognized by the parties as important and by the trier of fact as necessary to
the first judgment."' Syanon Church, 820 F.2d at 427 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMNTS § 27 cmt. j (1973)). For example, if a criminal trial turns on the veracity of the
defendant's alibi, the issue of the validity of the defendant's alibi would be "necessary" but
not "ultimate." Supra note 53.
According to Ashe, issues of "ultimate fact" trigger collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Thus, the Ashe Court appeared to endorse the ultimate-facts version
of collateral estoppel. Given the casualness of the Court's description of collateral estoppel,
however, the Ashe Court intended to provide only a general description of the collateral es-
toppel rule, not a final, binding statement of the rule. See id. at 443. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has not adhered strictly to the ultimate-facts version. See Syanon .Church, 820 F.2d at
426-27. rn fact, since Ashe the Court has stated that collateral estoppel applies to issues "nec-
essary" to the judgment, thereby perhaps endorsing the necessary-facts formulation of collat-
eral estoppel. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
124. Although the application of collateral estoppel in criminal cases should not be re-
quired under the Double Jeopardy Clause, other constitutional grounds exist for its applica-
tion. One could rationally argue that, based on the unfairness of forcing relitigation of an
issue on which a defendant previously had prevailed over the prosecution, criminal collateral
estoppel is embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. See
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (declining to decide whether criminal collateral es-
toppel is embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
In Ashe, however, the Court recognized collateral estoppel as a component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Perhaps this constitutional basis was chosen because it is easier to package
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In Grady the Supreme Court held that a double jeopardy violation
occurs only if conduct constituting an offense for which the defen-
dant was already prosecuted will 25 be proved in a second prosecu-
tion. 2 6 Although the Grady Court implied that the Grady rule was a
definition of "same offense," the Court did not identify any part of
the rule specifically intended to determine whether both prosecutions
involved the same offense. 27 In fact, this structural flaw prevents a
determinate application of the Grady rule. Although the Grady rule
can determine that successive prosecutions violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, the rule simply cannot answer the antecedent question:
Did both prosecutions involve the same offense? 28
collateral estoppel as a matter of double jeopardy concern than of due process concern. See
infra text accompanying notes 193-94. At first glance, collateral estoppel seems consistent
with the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause, in that both prevent the government from
doing something to criminal defendants a second time. Collateral estoppel prevents the gov-
ernment from forcing a defendant to litigate an issue a second time if the defendant succeeded
in litigating the issue the first time, while the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the govern-
ment from putting a defendant in jeopardy a second time after previously putting the defen-
dant in jeopardy for the same offense. Notwithstanding this cosmetic similarity, criminal
collateral estoppel is not properly considered a component of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
125. Grady is phrased in prospective terms; it bars subsequent prosecutions only if objec-
tionable evidence will be introduced. For a discussion of the possible applicability of Grady in
situations where objectionable evidence was not foreseen but was actually introduced, see Ri-
chardson, supra note 26, at 300-03.
126. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990).
127. Although the Grady court stated that Blockburger is not the "exclusive definition of
same offence" in the context of successive prosecutions, id. at 517 n.8, the Court did not
explain how its rule related to or affected the definition of same offense.
128. A determination as to whether both prosecutions involved the same offense logically
should involve identifying a set of facts in the first prosecution that is identical to set of facts
in the second prosecution. If such a set of same facts reasonably can be labelled an "of-
fense," then both prosecutions reasonably can be said to have involved the same offense. For
example, Blockburger requires that the court look for a set of statutory elements for the crime
charged in the first prosecution identical to a set of statutory elements in the second prosecu-
tion, A set of criminal statutory elements reasonably can be considered an "offense," so
Blockburger ensures a reasonable finding that both prosecutions involved the "same of-
fense."
For the Grady rule to bar a second prosecution, however, the only set of facts that must be
the same in both prosecutions is a set that defines certain culpable conduct. Although culpable
conduct reasonably can be categorized as an offense, the Grady rule does not stop there. For a
double jeopardy violation to occur urder Grady, it is not enough that both prosecutions in-
volved the same culpable conduct. Instead, the rule does not apply unless two further require-
ments are satisfied. First, the culpable conduct introduced in the second prosecution must
constitute an offense charged in the prior prosecution; it is not enough that culpable conduct
proved in the second prosecution was the same as culpable conduct proved in the first prose-
cution. Second, the culpable conduct must be offered at the second trial to establish an essen-
tial element of a crime charged in the second prosecution; the existence of proof of the
culpable conduct at the second trial is not enough, unless it is intended to establish an essen-
tial element.
Failure of either of these two further conditions means that no double jeopardy violation
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and commentators alike appar-
ently have assumed that both Ashe and Grady are, or at least con-
tain, definitions of "same offense."' 29 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has failed to recognize that the double jeopardy violation tests
lack what should be a prerequisite: a threshold determination as to
whether both jeopardies are for the same offense. Incognizant of
such a significant deficiency, the Court's tests for double jeopardy
violations make little sense, either in and of themselves or in relation
to one another.
Simply put, the muddled state of double jeopardy jurisprudence is
caused largely by the Supreme Court's abandonment of what should
be the anchor of the Court's double jeopardy analysis: a requirement
of same offenses. Absent this indispensable reference point, the Su-
preme Court's series of tests for double jeopardy violations cannot
make sense vis-a-vis the language of the Clause.
B. Ignoring the Requirement that Jeopardies Be "'for" the Same
Offense
Perhaps the most subtle problem with double jeopardy jurispru-
dence is the Supreme Court's lack of attention to the word "for" in
the Double Jeopardy Clause. In addition to requiring that multiple
jeopardies and same offenses exist, the text of the Clause also re-
quires that those multiple jeopardies be "for" the same offense. The
occurs under Grady. If it is the culpable conduct which constitutes the same offense in both
prosecutions, the failure of either of these conditions must cause the "sameness" of the culpa-
ble conduct in the two prosecutions to vanish, because failure of either condition could not
otherwise take the defendant's situation out of the ambit of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
However, failure of either condition is totally irrelevant to whether the culpable conduct
should be classified as the same offense. The odd requirements of the Grady rule, therefore,
work to divest offenses of their "sameness" for reasons totally unrelated to whether those
offenses should be considered the "same" in the first place. Thus, Grady contains no logical
means for identifying two sets of identifiable facts properly classifiable as "same offenses."
129. For example, in Grady, Justice Brennan's majority opinion suggested that the major-
ity and the dissent were arguing over whether the Court should broaden the definition of
"same offense" with the Grady rule. See infra note 143. Similarly, commentators have opined
that Grady defines or at least contains a definition of "same offenses." See, e.g., Anne
Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions in Complex
Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 95, 97 (1992) [hereinafter Poulin, Double Jeop-
ardy Protection] (stating that the Grady Court "enlarged the definition of same offense");
James M. Herrick, Note, Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes. Home: The "Same Conduct"
Standard in Grady v. Corbin, 79 Ky. L.J. 847 (1991); Paul R. Robinson, Comment, Grady v.
Corbin: Solidifying the Analysis of Double Jeopardy, 17 NEW ENO. J. ON CIUM. & CiV. CoN-
FINEMENT 395, 409-10, 421 (stating that Grady broadened the definition of "same offense" in
the Double Jeopardy Clause to include same "conduct," and listing Ashe as one of a series of
tests for "same offense"); Sara Barton, Case Comment, Grady v. Corbin, An Unsuccessful
Effort to Define "Same Offense", 25 GA. L. REV. 143, 143 (1990).
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justices' failure to appreciate the difference between multiple jeop-
ardies involving the same offense and multiple jeopardies for the
same offense has contributed to their confusion.
In everyday language, a significant difference can exist between an
event involving something and an event for something. For example,
although a bridal shower would be said to involve the guests, no one
would claim that it is for the guests; the shower is for the bride.
Similarly, under common English usage, multiple jeopardies can in-
volve the same offense but not be for the same offense.
The Supreme Court has not grasped the distinction, implicitly
equating "for" with "involving." For example, Ashe, which turned
on the fact that a single issue litigated in each of two prosecutions
related to a single criminal episode, 130 was concerned solely with
whether same offenses were involved in each of two prosecutions.'
Indeed, Ashe bars relitigation of certain issues in a second prosecu-
tion, irrespective of what crimes are charged in either prosecution.'
In other words, Ashe operates without regard to what the successive
prosecution is for.
Arguably, courts should construe "for" to mean the same thing as
"involving."' 3 Such a construction, however, is not self-evident. 3 4
In any event, the matter has a substantial impact on the extent of
double jeopardy rights; a narrow interpretation of the word "for"
would restrict double jeopardy rights, while interpreting "for"
broadly enough to mean "involving" would expand double jeopardy
130. Ashe held that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the defendant receive the benefit
of collateral estoppel, meaning that once an issue of ultimate fact is decided in favor of the
defendant and against the government, the issue cannot be relitigated between the defendant
and the same government. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57. The issue which the pros-
ecution seeks to relitigate would not necessarily relate to criminal conduct. See supra text
accompanying notes 123-24. In Ashe, however, as in most cases, the issue subject to relitiga-
tion did relate to criminal conduct.
131. In Ashe, criminal collateral estoppel applied because a single issue was involved in
two successive prosecutions. Because the single issue related to a single criminal episode, it is
reasonable to conclude that the Ashe Court was largely influenced by the fact that one
"same" offense was involved-to the extent of giving rise to an issue-in each of two succes-
sive prosecutions.
132. The collateral estoppel rule operates regardless of the cause of action in which the
relevant issue was raised. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 374 n.318 (noting that collateral estop-
pel sometimes fails to bar a second prosecution even if it would bar relitigation of an issue in
the second prosecution).
133. In some contexts, "for" does mean "involving." See Webster's Ninth New Colle-
giate Dictionary 481 (1989) (defining "for," in definition number 7, as "concerning," which
is a close cousin of "involving").
134. "For" is capable of many different definitions, depending on the context, some of
which are significantly different from "involving." See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
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rights. The issue is thus too important to be left to mere implication
and assumption.
Moreover, the uncertain role of the word "for" in double jeop-
ardy analysis has caused problems in the justices' reasoning. For ex-
ample, in Dixon, Justice White rejected the government's argument
that criminal contempt and the underlying crime were different of-
fenses because the two crimes violated different governmental inter-
ests.' Justice White concluded that the legislative interests served by
statutes should be irrelevant to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars successive prosecutions for violation of those statutes, 3 6 be-
cause the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to limit-not defer
to-the legislative prerogative to bring those successive prosecu-
tions.137 Justice White's comments, in addition to being irrelevant to
the argument that they purportedly address, 38 are disappointing be-
cause he did not recognize that the language of the Clause itself indi-
cates how double jeopardy analysis should take into account the
governmental policy behind the criminal statutes at issue.
The word "for" suggests the proper place of governmental policy
in double jeopardy analysis. For example, to say that the govern-
ment may prosecute a defendant successively for criminal contempt
and the underlying crime because they do not violate the same gov-
ernmental interest is to say that they are not "for" the same of-
fense. 39 A prosecution under a criminal contempt statute is a
prosecution for the act prohibited by the criminal contempt statute-
violating a court order. This is true regardless of what offenses the
defendant committed in violating the order. By contrast, a prosecu-
tion brought under the underlying criminal statute is a prosecution
for the act prohibited by the underlying statute-committing the un-
derlying crime. Thus, the criminal contempt prosecutions in Dixon
were not for the underlying offenses even though they undeniably
135. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2870-71 (1993)(White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2871. By contrast, Justice White noted that the Court has not considered the
Double Jeopardy Clause to be a check on legislative power to impose cumulative punish-
ments. In fact, in the cumulative-punishment context, the Court has considered the Double
Jeopardy Clause merely an aid for determining whether a legislature would have wanted to
impose cumulative punishments. See id. at 2870. Thus, Justice White conceded that in cumu-
lative punishments, a difference in the governmental interests protected by two statutes might
be relevant to whether cumulative punishments under both statutes violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. Id.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 162-66.
139. Instead of advancing this proposition in Dixon, the government argued that criminal
contempt and the underlying crime were not the same offense.
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involved the same offenses.140 In this manner, the text of the Clause
is reconcilable with the belief that the government sometimes should
be allowed to conduct successive prosecutions to vindicate separate
interests in cases involving the same offense.
As Justice White's dissent reveals, the failure to recognize the po-
tentially unique connotations of the word "for" hinders the effort to
reconcile relevant policy arguments with the text of the Clause. As
set forth in Section V below, however, the Supreme Court easily
could correct this shortcoming by specifically asking whether a de-
fendant, in a case presenting two jeopardies involving the same of-
fense, actually was put in jeopardy twice for that offense.
C. Misunderstanding the Crux of the Debate
As noted above,'141 the Supreme Court has been more willing to
find double jeopardy violations in successive prosecutions than in
multiple punishments. 42 The Court has justified this distinction on
the grounds that the definition of "same offense" is broader for suc-
cessive prosecutions than for multiple punishments. 43 Such an expla-
nation, however, is both inaccurate and counterproductive.
1. The Court's Decisions Have Not Turned on the Definition of
"Same Offense"
First, the explanation simply is not accurate in light of the kind of
extra protection prescribed by the Supreme Court in successive pro-
140. In Dixon, the same offense undeniably was involved in both the criminal contempt
proceeding and the subsequent prosecution; in the cases of both petitioners, the subsequent
prosecution was for the same offense on which the contempt proceeding was based.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 42-79.
142. "The interests at stake in avoiding successive prosecutions are different from those at
stake in the prohibition against multiple punishments, and our cases reflect this reality. The
protection against successive prosecutions is the central protection provided by the Clause."
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2882 (1993)(Souter, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
143. Grady provides perhaps the best illustration of the Court's confusion of the threshold
issue of what constitutes "same offenses" with the ultimate issue of whether the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause provides protection against successive prosecutions. In Grady, Justice Brennan
purported to respond specifically to Justice Scalia's assertion that Blockburger constitutes the
sole definition of "same offense." Justice Brennan's response was to note that In re Nielsen
and Ashe provided additional double jeopardy protection in successive prosecutions. Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 517 (1990). The fact that Ashe and In re Nielsen provide such protec-
tion, however, is irrelevant to whether they prescribe a definition of same offense broader
than Blackburger's.
Confronting Justice Scalia on this issue and defending his creation of the Grady rule,
Justice Brennan appeared to believe that Grady also prescribed a definition of same offense.
However, Grady prescribes no such threshold definition, but rather defines a complete test for
determining when successive prosecutions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See supra
notes 127-28.
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secutions. As set forth above,'" before Dixon, Ashe and Grady con-
stituted the only protection against successive prosecutions
unquestionably distinct qualitatively from Blockburger.'4 Neither
Ashe nor Grady, however, contains a definition of "same offense."
Thus, the extra protection offered by Ashe and Grady does not re-
sult from the fact that those cases prescribe an expanded definition
of "same offense." Although the Supreme Court has mandated
broader protection in successive prosecutions than in multiple pun-
ishments, the broader protection is not due to a broader definition of
"same offense."146
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court had prescribed a different
definition of "same offense" for each context, bifurcating the defi-
nition would be unjustifiable. First, in simplest terms, it is intrinsi-
cally unsatisfying to contemplate that "same offenses" are not
always "same offenses.' 1 47 Second, logic discourages varying the
definition of "same offense" with the context involved. In deciding
whether two same offenses exist, logic dictates that one must first
determine whether there are two "offenses," and then, if so,
whether the two offenses are the same. Neither inquiry should de-
pend at all upon the context involved. Assuming that two offenses
are involved, 148 the Court logically should juxtapose the two offen-
ses, compare their characteristics, and decide whether their charac-
teristics are sufficiently similar so that the offenses should be dubbed
the "same."' 49 Such a procedure should not take into account the
context in which the issue of "sameness" has arisen.
At first glance, this proposition-that for double jeopardy pur-
poses, "same" means "same "-appears to rest on a literal view-
point of language in general, and constitutional interpretation in
144. See supra text accompanying notes 52-76.
145. See supra note 119.
146. The ultimate question of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has been violated is
different from the question of whether "same offenses" are involved. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 154-61; supra text accompanying notes 79-89 (noting that the special double jeop-
ardy rules can mandate a finding of no double jeopardy violation even when the court finds
"same offenses").
147. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993)("[1]t is embarrassing to
assert that the single term 'same offence' (the words of the Fifth Amendment at issue here)
has two different meanings-that what is the same offense is yet not the same offense.").
148. Usually, both of the defendant's jeopardies clearly involve "offenses" for purposes
of the Clause. A double jeopardy claim usually arises when a defendanf has been jeopard-
ized-punished and/or prosecuted-under substantive criminal statutes defining "offenses."
However, in Dixon, the Supreme Court had to determine, at least implicitly, that criminal
contempt is an "offense." See id. at 2855-56. Dixon thus presents a rare example of a prose-
cutorial argument that the defendant has not been jeopardized for "offenses."
149. See supra note 128.
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particular. The point of this proposition, however, is not that a word
used in the Constitution can have one true meaning which cannot
vary with the context; as is understood by realistic observers of lan-
guage communication, a word acquires its meaning from how people
use it, and has different meanings in different contexts because peo-
ple often use words differently in different contexts. 50 The point,
rather, is that the Supreme Court should not give "same" varying
meanings without a sufficient reason for doing so. However, the Su-
preme Court's recognition of multiple definitions for the word
''same" is not justified by the usual reason for recognizing multiple
definitions for a single word: different uses in different contexts.
Had the Supreme Court not said otherwise, surely few would have
thought to vary the use of "same" depending on the double jeop-
ardy context involved. 5'
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never invoked this reason
to justify its recognition of a different, broader definition of "same
offense" in the context of successive prosecutions. Instead, the
Court's justification has rested on policy grounds; a defendant is
constitutionally entitled to greater protection against successive pro-
secutions,'5 2 so the definition of "same offense" should be broader
for successive prosecutions."'
This justification is flawed. Even if the Court's stilted treatment
of the English language could be excused whenever necessary to pro-
tect criminal defendants, the Court could protect criminal defen-
dants without illogically bifurcating the definition of "same
offense." The Court could provide defendants extra protection
against successive prosecutions without either (1) bifurcating the def-
inition of "same offense," or, worse yet, (2) deceiving itself into be-
lieving that it has bifurcated the definition of "same offense" when
in fact it has not.
150. Thus, one can believe that "same" means "same" without maintaining, for instance,
that "too" means "too." "Too" does not have one meaning for every context; it might mean
"also" or it might mean "excessively." The reason to accept that the meaning of "too" var-
ies with the context is that common experience tells us that people use the word differently in
different contexts. By contrast, until the Supreme Court decided, for policy reasons, that the
meaning of "same" should vary depending upon whether successive prosecutions or cumula-
tive punishments were at issue, an ordinary user of the English language doubtless would not
have thought that "same" had a different meaning in one context than the other.
151. If Supreme Court precedent is ignored, one would not anticipate even casual legal
observers speaking on the subject of double jeopardy to say, "Of course, I mean 'same' in the
successive-prosecution sense, not the multiple-punishment sense."
152. See supra note 142.
153. See supra note 143.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
2. Misperceiving the Debate Over "Jeopardy" as a Debate Over
"Same Offense"
The impression that the Court's double jeopardy cases turn on the
definition of "same offense" is more than just inaccurate. It also is
counterproductive, because it fosters a misunderstanding as to the
true reason for the extra protection against successive prosecutions.
By suggesting that the crucial difference between successive prosecu-
tions and multiple punishments is that offenses are more apt to be
the same where successive prosecutions are involved, the Court ob-
scures its true beliefs regarding the differences between the two con-
texts. A student of the Court easily could believe that the contexts
differ only in that offenses magically tend to be more similar when
scrutinized in the context of successive prosecutions. Not only is
such an impression incorrect, 54 it unfortunately diverts the student's
attention from the truly important distinction between the two con-
texts.
Given the Court's stated reasons for providing extra protection
against successive prosecutions,' 5 the difference between the con-
texts clearly relates not to the requirement of "same offenses," but
rather to the requirement of two jeopardies. Specifically, successive
prosecutions are a different kind of jeopardy than multiple punish-
ments. Indeed, from the standpoint of constitutional rights; succes-
sive prosecutions are a more significant kind of jeopardy because
they impose greater burdens on criminal defendants than do multiple
punishments.
The imposition of multiple punishments for the "same offense"
harms a criminal defendant more than the imposition of a single
punishment only by increasing his overall punishment; multiple pun-
ishments harm a criminal defendant only to the extent that their sum
exceeds the punishment from a single punishment. However, the
mere fact that a court imposes two different punishments-one for
each of two same offenses-does not mean the defendant's punish-
ment exceeds what it would have been under punishment only for
one offense.
For instance, a defendant might be convicted in a single prosecu-
tion for two different offenses that are the same under Blockburger.
Suppose that the greater offense is punishable by ten to twenty-five
years in prison, while the lesser offense is punishable by five to ten
years in prison. It is quite conceivable that the sentence-giver-either
the judge or the jury-would first decide the appropriate total length
of the sentence, based on the facts of the case, and only later, just
154. See supra text accompanying notes 145-61.
155. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text; supra note 143.
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for the record, apportion that length between the greater and lesser
crimes. In this plausible scenario, the defendant has not suffered by
receiving multiple punishments for the same offense.
Moreover, the Constitution 15 6 probably would have permitted a
court to impose the length of the combined sentence under just one
of the statutes, if state law so permitted.5 7 Thus, if the defendant
was sentenced to fifteen years for the greater offense and ten years
for the lesser offense, the defendant's objection to the twenty-five-
year net sentence is not very compelling, because the defendant had
no right not to be sentenced to twenty-five years for the greater of-
fense alone.
By contrast, successive prosecutions inherently harm a defendant.
The harm inflicted on a defendant by successive prosecutions is irre-
versible and unavoidable. Once a second prosecution is commenced
against a defendant, the defendant must devote time, energy, and
perhaps money to cope with the prosecution. 58 The defendant would
not have been so harmed had the successive prosecutions never taken
place. This is in contrast to multiple punishments, which might not
harm the defendant any more than he would have been harmed if
multiple punishments had not taken place.5 9
Thus, the Court's true justification for additional double jeopardy
protection in the context of successive prosecutions is that successive
prosecutions put defendants in a worse jeopardy than do multiple
punishments. Admittedly, the Court has emphasized that successive
prosecutions raise more pressing double jeopardy concerns than do
multiple punishments.16° Rather than identify these more pressing
concerns as the reason for increased protection against successive
prosecutions, however, the Court misleadingly has attributed the in-
creased double jeopardy protection to the increased sameness of of-
fenses in the context of successive prosecutions.' 6'
156. Other than the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is the constitutional provision most likely violated
solely by virtue of the length of a sentence.
157. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1993)(stating that if a state constitution-
ally may impose a 15-year sentence under a statute, it constitutionally may impose a 25-year
sentence under the statute). But see Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 690 n.4
(1979)("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . would presumably pro-
hibit state courts from depriving persons of liberty or property . . . except to the extent au-
thorized by state law.").
158. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518 (1990)(citing Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
159. See supra text preceding note 156.
160. See supra note 143.
161. See supra note 144.
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In addition to being misleading, these pronouncements are coun-
terproductive in that they tend to obscure the very proposition that
the Court itself wishes to establish: that successive prosecutions bur-
den defendants more severely than multiple punishments. By attrib-
uting the extra protection against successive prosecutions to the
increased sameness of offenses rather than the increased severity of
the jeopardy, the Court diverts attention from the special need to
prevent the severe kind of double jeopardy inflicted by successive
prosecutions.
In summary, the Court has mischaracterized the crux of the dou-
ble jeopardy debate. In particular, the Court purports to debate
whether it should recognize more than one definition of "same of-
fense." In substance, however, the argument is over whether to rec-
ognize more than one category of "jeopardy," and then vary the
amount of double jeopardy protection with the category.
D. Mismatching Questions and Answers
The Court's confusion of the threshold issue of what constitutes
"same offenses" with the ultimate issue of whether successive prose-
cutions are impermissible causes a third unfortunate effect: justices
address the latter issue when they supposedly are addressing the for-
mer.
For example, in Dixon the government argued that criminal con-
tempt and the underlying crime were not the same offense because
they violated two different governmental interests. 62 In his opinion,
Justice White purported to address this argument and reject it, es-
sentially on the grounds that the defendant's interest in avoiding suc-
cessive prosecutions outweighed the government's interest in
vindicating both governmental interests. 63 White's analysis arguably
shows that the successive prosecutions in Dixon were unfair, but it
does not show why criminal contempt and the underlying crime are
the same offense-the issue that Justice White purported to be ad-
dressing.'6 After all, successive prosecutions for criminal contempt
and the underlying crime could be considered unfair and unduly bur-
densome to defendants even if not for the same offense. Thus,
162. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2854 (1993).
163. See id. at 2869-71 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. One might argue that Justice White implicitly indicated that the offenses were the
same because he found that the Double Jeopardy Clause had been violated. However, to so
argue is to put the cart before the horse. The existence of same offenses should be a threshold
requirement for finding a double jeopardy violation. Double jeopardy violations occur be-
cause there are same offenses; same offenses do not exist because there is a double jeopardy
violation.
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Justice White interchanged the issue of sameness of offenses with the
issue of whether successive prosecutions should be barred as unfair.
Similarly, the Grady Court'65 and commentators' 66 have intermingled
the same two issues. The inability to distinguish the two issues hin-
ders the effort to arrive at a sensible resolution of either issue.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
In light of the flaws in the Supreme Court approach, double jeop-
ardy jurisprudence must be reformed to be clear, structured, and
faithful to the language of the Clause. In addition, the reformed ap-
proach should be flexible enough to accommodate both broad and
narrow interpretations of the scope of the Clause's protection. Fur-
thermore, the reformed methodology should focus on the govern-
ment's precise interest in the successive prosecutions at issue. In
short, such an approach would be clear, flexible, and durable-all
without subjugating the language of the Clause to judicial fiat.
The methodology set forth below satisfies such criteria. It com-
prises a two-step double jeopardy test applicable to both cumulative
punishments and successive prosecutions. In addition, it comprises a
third step, a due process test, applicable only to successive prosecu-
tions.
In step one, a court explicitly inquires whether the defendant has
been put in jeopardy more than once and whether those jeopardies
involved the same offense. 167 Step one provides the Supreme Court
with the opportunity to announce precedential definitions of "same
165. In Grady, Justice Brennan appeared to assert that Grady constituted a new definition
of "same offense." Supra note 144. However, Justice Brennan's true reason for creating the
Grady rule was to prevent unfair prosecutions, not to prevent two jeopardies for a "same
offense." See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990). Although Justice Brennan pur-
ported to address the issue of what constituted "same offenses," he actually addressed the
broader issue of what successive prosecutions should be prohibited as unfair.
166. For example, in Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection, supra note 129, at 100-01, Pro-
fessor Poulin includes a section entitled, "Ilefining the Same Offense," in which she phrases
the ultimate question in successive-prosecution cases as: "[T]o what extent does the Constitu-
tion permit fragmentation of prosecutions arising from a single course of criminal conduct?"
167. Step one can be regarded as containing two substeps, determining whether multiple
jeopardies exist, and determining whether those multiple jeopardies involve the same offense.
Substeps one and two, however, are interrelated. In the usual case, the best indicator of the
existence of a "jeopardy" would be the fact that the defendant has been charged with or
punished for an offense. In other words, a "jeopardy" exists not in a vacuum, but only in
connection with a specific offense. Thus, the determination of whether multiple jeopardies
exist is interrelated with, and perhaps even subsequent to, the court's identification of the
offenses to be compared for sameness. Thus, substeps one and two cannot logically be under-
taken without reference to each other. As a result, it is probably more useful to consider this
part of the methodology a single step with two substeps, rather than two steps.
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offense" and "jeopardy" for lower courts to use in conducting their
own two-step double jeopardy tests. If step one indicates that the
defendant was subjected to two jeopardies involving the same of-
fense, then in step two a court determines whether those jeopardies
were both for that same offense. After steps one and two, the double
jeopardy inquiry ends.
In cumulative-punishment cases, steps one and two comprise the
entire inquiry into the permissibility of those cumulative punish-
ments. If successive prosecutions do not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, however, a court then proceeds to step three, and determines
whether the successive prosecutions at issue are so unfair that they
are impermissible under the Due Process Clause.
A. Identifying Multiple Jeopardies and Same Offenses: Satisfying
Textual Prerequisites for Double Jeopardy Protection
1. Identifying Multiple Jeopardies and Same Offenses
The proposed methodology begins with the actual language of the
Clause. In particular, step one requires the court to determine inde-
pendently whether the defendant was subjected to more than one
jeopardy and, if so, whether the multiple jeopardies involved the
same offense. Step one would provide the Supreme Court the oppor-
tunity to develop an evolving set of definitions for "same offense"
and "jeopardy" for lower courts to use in applying step one in their
own double jeopardy cases.
Step one, though grounded in the text of the Clause, is not a by-
product of strict constructionism. Under this step, the terms "jeop-
ardy" and "same offense" must be construed, but they need not be
construed strictly. Ensuring that the textual prerequisites for double
jeopardy protection are present in a given case does not necessarily
restrict double jeopardy rights. Indeed, by adopting broad defini-
tions, the Supreme Court could use step one to increase double jeop-
ardy rights. By the same token, a Supreme Court less receptive to
double jeopardy rights could decrease double jeopardy protection by
narrowing the definitions of "same offense" or "jeopardy."
The Supreme Court could define "same offense" in any number
of ways. 68 For example, it could equate "same offense" with "same
168. Although more definitions conceivably could exist, commentators have identified six
possible definitions of "same offense." See George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Suc-
cessive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REV. 323,
330-32 (1986); Paul R. Robinson, Comment, Grady v. Corbin: Solidifying the Analysis of
Double Jeopardy, 17 NEW ENO. J. ON CLIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 395, 408-15 (1991).
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conduct." 69 Under this broad definition, the government could not
subject a defendant to cumulative punishments or successive prose-
cutions for 70 the same conduct, thus offering defendants a signifi-
cant amount of double jeopardy protection. At the other end of the
spectrum, the Supreme Court could define "same offense" as "of-
fense defined under the same statute.', 7' Under this ultra-narrow
definition, offenses defined in two different statutes containing iden-
tical elements 72 would not constitute the same offense because they
are set out in different statutes. 73 Between the extremes, the Su-
preme Court could continue to use Blockburger as its sole
definition 74 of same offense.
Similarly, the Supreme Court could vary its definition of "jeop-
ardy." For example, in Dixon, the Court held that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause did apply to contempt proceedings, thereby implicitly
finding that a contempt proceeding is a "jeopardy."' ' 3 However, if
169. Justice Brennan approached this definition under his proposed "same transaction"
test, under which the government must bring all charges against a defendant arising out of a
single transaction in a single trial. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970). This test
superficially appears to define "same offense" as "same transaction," i.e., "same conduct."
However, the same transaction test does not prescribe a definition of "same offense."
Rather, it is a complete description of when successive prosecutions are impermissible, and
contains no interim mechanism for making a threshold determination of the presence of
"same offenses." Moreover, by its terms the test is applicable only in successive prosecutions.
Thus, even if the same transaction test did define "same offense" to mean "same transac-
tion" or "same conduct," such a definition would be applicable only in successive prosecu-
tions. Such a definition would be unsuitable for the proposed multi-step double jeopardy
methodology, which seeks a uniform definition of "same offense" applicable in both the suc-
cessive-prosecution and the multiple-punishment contexts.
170. For a discussion of the requirement that cumulative punishments or successive prose-
cutions be "for" the same offense, see infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
171. It seems inconceivable that "same offense" reasonably could be defined any more
narrowly than "offense defined under the same statute."
172. Such statutes would outlaw crimes that are the "same offense" according to Block-
burger.
173. This definition is undesirable in that it puts form over substance.
174. Blockburger is the only existing enunciation of a true definition of "same offense."
See supra note 144 (noting that although several tests prohibit certain successive prosecutions,
only Blockburger sets forth a threshold definition of same offenses).
175. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993). The Dixon court did not clearly
specify the basis for the government's argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
apply to criminal contempt proceedings. The argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not apply to contempt proceedings, however, must rely on the contentions that a criminal
contempt proceeding is not a jeopardy or that criminal contempt is not an offense. No other
contentions could support such an argument. However, these contentions are so interrelated
that they are essentially the same. See supra note 167. Either way, such argument relies on the
contention that a criminal contempt proceeding is not a jeopardy. As a result, in rejecting the
argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to criminal contempt proceedings,
the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the argument that a criminal contempt proceeding is not
a jeopardy.
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the Dixon Court had wished to contract double jeopardy rights, it
could have denied double jeopardy protection on the grounds that a
criminal contempt proceeding is not a "jeopardy" within the mean-
ing of the Clause.'76
In summation, the Supreme Court could use step one to control
the scope of double jeopardy rights by expanding or contracting its
definitions. Step one thus would provide the Court both flexibility
and an opportunity to announce clear definitions. At the same time,
step one would restore the text of the Clause as the guiding light for
double jeopardy jurisprudence, thus preventing double jeopardy law
from succumbing completely to the passing whims of the Supreme
Court.
2. Accounting for the Special Double Jeopardy Rules
To simplify double jeopardy inquiries, a methodology must take
account of the special double jeopardy rules that reverse what other-
wise would be a finding of a double jeopardy violation.' 7 Any dou-
ble jeopardy methodology unable to account for the special rules is
incomplete; it would not necessarily resolve a double jeopardy claim,
because the special rules existing outside of the methodology could
resolve the claim. This would defeat the methodology's goal of re-
solving every double jeopardy claim by embodying all double jeop-
ardy rules in a single framework.
Step one prevents this undesirable effect, because it can encompass
the Supreme Court's special rules, preventing what otherwise would
be a finding of double jeopardy. In all situations addressed by the
special rules, the ultimate result-no double jeopardy violation-
could be explained by the absence of a second jeopardy or the ab-
sence of same offenses. In other words, the Supreme Court could
characterize the special rules as additional tests for determining when
176. If the Court had so held, the pending criminal prosecutions in Dixon would have
constituted only a first jeopardy, thus rendering inapplicable the Clause's protections against
second jeopardies.
The Supreme Court hs granted certiorari in another case which illustrates how the Court
can resolve double jeopardy claims based on the definition of "jeopardy." In Kurth Ranch v.
Montana Dept. of Revenue, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted 114 S. Ct. 38
(1993)(No. 93-144, 1994 Term), the respondents were sentenced to prison on drug charges.
The Montana Department of Revenue subsequently applied a nearly $865,000 marijuana tax
to the petitioners' business enterprise. Id. at 1310. The respondents sued to have the assess-
ment set aside on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 1309. The bankruptcy judge set aside the
assessment, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court could decide this case
easily under step one of the proposed methodology, simply by determining whether a tax as-
sessment is a "jeopardy."
177. See supra text accompanying notes 70-89.
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the defendant's situation involves a single, continuous jeopardy,
rather than two jeopardies, or for determining when the defendant's
situation does not involve same offenses. "'
As a result, the Supreme Court easily could embody the special
rules in the proposed methodology by holding that in situations now
governed by the special rules, step one's requirement of multiple
jeopardies or same offenses has not been satisfied. For example, in
step one, the Court could easily recognize the special rule permitting
retrial of a defendant after a defense-requested mistrial simply by
holding that the retrial and the original trial constitute only a single
jeopardy.179 The Court could take account of the other special rules
in similar fashion.8 0 On the other hand, step one also provides the
178. See infra note 180 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the special rules
are explainable by the absence of two jeopardies or lack of same offenses. The Court has not
explained the special rules on this basis, but has justified the rules occasionally permitting
retrial after mistrial on policy, rather than textual, grounds. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S.
667 (1982)(explaining that a retrial is generally permissible after a defense-request mistrial
because policy considerations weigh in favor of the retrial); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 505 (1978)(stating that if the mistrial is a "manifest necessity," a retrial is permitted after
a mistrial granted over defendant's objection because a retrial would not be so unfair to the
defendant as to outweigh the government's interest in the retrial).
The Court has justified the special rule occasionally permitting cumulative punishment for
offenses that are the same under Blockburger not on textual grounds, but rather on separation
of powers principles. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 695 (1980). Of the
special rules, only the dual sovereign rule has been explained somewhat on textual grounds.
See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)(indicating that crimes are not the same if
defined by different sovereigns). The Court has not particularly emphasized the textual basis
for the dual sovereign rule, however, and has not applied the dual sovereign rule in the con-
text of a disciplined textual methodology.
179. Such a holding effects a reasonable construction of the concept of a "jeopardy" and
is an easy rule for lower courts to comprehend.
180. Under step one, the Court could recognize the dual sovereign rule, see supra notes 82-
83 and accompanying text, simply by holding that offenses defined by two different sover-
eigns are not the "same." In fact, the Court has suggested such a basis for the dual sovereign
rule. See supra note 178. The problem, however, is that because the Court has not connected
the dual sovereign rule to an all-encompassing framework, the dual sovereign rule appears to
be an exception to the Clause's prohibition of multiple jeopardies for the same offense. By
embodying the dual sovereign rule within the framework of the proposed methodology, how-
ever, the Court would clarify that the dual sovereign rule permits successive prosecutions by
different sovereigns precisely because those prosecutions are not forthe same offense.
Under step one, the Court also could recognize the special rule permitting retrial after a
mistrial ordered over the defendant's objection if the prosecution shows that the mistrial was
a "manifest necessity." See supra note 81 and accompanying text. To do so, the Court need
only hold that whenever the prosecution can show manifest necessity, the retrial and original
trial constitute only a single, continuing jeopardy rather than two jeopardies. This result is
somewhat unsatisfying, because the determination of whether a mistrial and a retrial consti-
tute one continuous jeopardy or two separate jeopardies arguably should not turn on the rea-
son for the mistrial. The retrial either is or is not properly considered a continuation of the
original trial, and the answer should not depend on why the prosecution wanted the mistrial.
This discussion demonstrates the problems with recognizing, solely out of deference to the
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Court with the flexibility to eliminate the special rules. For instance,
if the Court wished to abolish the dual sovereign rule,' 8 1 it could do
so merely by holding that two offenses otherwise the same under step
one are not different solely because they are defined by two different
sovereigns.
Thus, the proposed methodology easily can effect the results
achieved either by the special rules or by the absence of the special
rules. Under the Court's approach, however, those results arise by
virtue of a smattering of special rules collateral to, and in tension
with,182 the affirmative tests. In contrast, the proposed methodology
dictates those results as part and parcel of the Court's core double
jeopardy inquiry into the existence of two "jeopardies" and "same
offenses."
B. Ensuring that the Jeopardies Are "'for" the Same Offense
As set forth above, 83 part of the prevailing confusion in double
jeopardy cases is attributable to the Court's failure to consider the
significance of the word "for" in the Clause. The Court could de-
crease such confusion by requiring that if a court has found multiple
jeopardies involving the same offense, the court then must inquire
into whether those jeopardies were for that offense.
If one subscribes to the admittedly defensible viewpoint that
"for" should carry the broad definition "involving," then this sec-
ond step merely repeats the first step and is thus unnecessary. The
prosecution's needs and wants, a rule permitting a retrial of a defendant. Such a rule subverts
both the text of the Clause and the defendant's double jeopardy rights to the prosecution's
interests. First, by its terms, the Double Jeopardy Clause sets forth an absolute prohibition
against multiple jeopardies for the same offense; it does not contemplate that multiple jeop-
ardies for the same offense e'er are permissible. The text does not indicate that multiple jeop-
ardies for the same offense, though otherwise impermissible, are permissible when the
government has a good reason for requiring a second jeopardy.
Nevertheless, if the Court is bent on sacrificing the text of the Clause and the defendant's
rights to prosecutorial interests, it is preferable to do so with a rule situated in the context of a
cohesive methodology, rather than with the current dual sovereign rule, which appears unre-
lated and collateral to the central double jeopardy analysis.
Finally, under step one, the Court also could recognize the rule that a court may impose
cumulative punishments on a defendant even for offenses that are the same under Blockbur-
ger, as long as the legislature intended punishment to be cumulative. See Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). To do so, the Supreme Court need only hold that in these situations,
the cumulative punishment constitutes only one punishment, i.e., only one jeopardy.
181. For a discussion of the dual sovereign rule, see supra text accompanying notes 82 and
83.
182. The special rules are in tension with the affirmative tests whenever the special rules
dictate a finding of no double jeopardy violation in spite of the affirmative tests indicating a
double jeopardy violation.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 130-40.
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second step is necessary only if "for" carries a meaning narrower
than "involving." The proposed methodology includes this second
step, however, because "for" probably should have a narrower defi-
nition.
First, criminal prosecutions and convictions are one of the many
contexts 84 in which "for" tends to be used in a specific, somewhat
narrow sense. To demonstrate, imagine a court observer asking,
"What is the defendant being prosecuted for?" or "What was the
defendant convicted for?" Experience tells us that the observer ex-
pects a somewhat limited response amounting to a description of the
actual charges brought against the defendant, rather than a discus-
sion of the facts underlying the defendant's case. By contrast, if the
observer were to ask, "What did the defendant's prosecution in-
volve?" the observer probably expects a more detailed account of
the defendant's case than a mere description of the actual charges.
Therefore, the word "for" refers more specifically to the actual
charges brought against the defendant, and "involving" refers more
generally to the surrounding facts of the defendant's case.,8 5 Thus,
the common usage of the word "for" in the context of criminal
jeopardies suggests that a jeopardy "for" an offense refers to the
charges, rather than the facts, in the defendant's case.
Second, as the Government argued in Dixon,86 situations arise in
which the defendant unquestionably has faced two jeopardies involv-
ing the same offense, and yet the second jeopardy is intended to vin-
dicate an interest so different from the interest vindicated in the first
jeopardy that it simply is unfair to force the government to vindicate
both interests at the same time. In Dixon, for example, it seems fair
to have allowed the prosecution to deal with the defendants' viola-
tion of the court orders (by committing the underlying offenses) be-
fore dealing with the underlying offenses. In fact, if the Government
is not so allowed, the defendant could benefit from violating a court
order by committing the underlying offense; such violation would
force the prosecution to prepare a joint prosecution for contempt
and the underlying offense, likely disrupting the prosecution's pre-
ferred and ordinary mode of conducting either prosecution. 8 7
184. In certain other contexts, "for" carries a limited specific meaning. For example,
imagine a birthday present labeled, "For Mother." The word "for" means that the package is
to be opened and/or owned by Mother, not that the package-is concerning or relating to
Mother.
185. Again, such a proposition is simply a matter of common English usage.
186. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2870 (1993)(White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
187. For example, in Dixon the Federal Government was not represented at Mr. Foster's
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This is not to say that the Supreme Court should sacrifice even-
handed double jeopardy analysis for the sake of prosecutorial con-
venience. On the contrary, in interpreting the Clause, it is proper to
consider fairness and policy concerns from the prosecution's or the
defendant's viewpoint, as long as the resulting interpretation reason-
ably comports with the language of the Clause. Evenhanded, disci-
plined interpretation is compromised only when concerns over policy
and fairness result in an unreasonable interpretation of the Clause.
Proposed step two, however, requires courts to be faithful to the lan-
guage of the Clause. Thus, step two's accommodation of legitimate
prosecutorial concerns does not compromise the actual language of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
C. Substituting the Due Process Clause for the Double Jeopardy
Clause as Guardian Against Certain Unfair Successive Prosecutions
Although the Supreme Court has identified the Double Jeopardy
Clause as the source of protection against successive prosecutions be-
yond Blockburger, such protection is not explainable by even the
broadest possible interpretation of the language of the Clause.' The
Court probably has invoked the Double Jeopardy Clause because
such protection superficially seems to be a protection against double
jeopardy.1t 9 In erroneously invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the Court has overlooked the perfect origin for additional protection
against successive prosecutions: the Due Process Clause. 9'
contempt hearing. Instead, counsel for Ms. Foster, the one injured by Mr. Foster's alleged
acts of contempt, prosecuted the contempt action. See id. at 2854. Presumably, the Federal
Government preferred not to expend effort in the contempt action, concentrating instead on
preparing for the subsequent trial for the underlying offense. Under Dixon, however, the Fed-
eral Government must be prepared to bring its entire case at the time of the contempt proceed-
ing, lest the Double Jeopardy Clause bar the subsequent prosecution for the underlying
offense.
188. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
189. Ashe and Grady deceptively appear to constitute protection against what reasonably
might be called "double jeopardy," because they both prohibit the government from doing
something to criminal defendants a second time. Ashe prohibits the government from forcing
a criminal defendant to litigate a second time an issue on which the defendant prevailed the
first time. Grady prohibits the government from conducting a second prosecution against a
defendant, if the government will prove conduct constituting an offense for which the defen-
dant was prosecuted earlier. However, Ashe and Grady do not prevent the government from
putting defendants in jeopardy a second time after the government has put them in jeopardy a
first time. See supra text accompanying notes 118-28. As a result, even if Ashe and Grady
prohibit the government from doing something to defendants a second time, they do not pro-
hibit double jeopardy.
190. For the purposes of this Article, no distinction need be made between the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to state governments, and the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal government.
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To be sure, the Supreme Court has fleetingly addressed the inter-
section of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Due Process Clause.
Courts occasionally confront due process and double jeopardy
claims brought simultaneously by a single defendant based on identi-
cal facts. 191 The Court even has prohibited certain prosecutorial ac-
tivity on due process grounds when the Double Jeopardy Clause
seemed more applicable to at least one justice. 192 The Court, how-
ever, has never barred a second prosecution on due process grounds
when it has explicitly considered invoking the- Double Jeopardy
Clause instead.
It is not difficult to surmise the reason for the Court's reliance on
the Double Jeopardy Clause instead of the Due Process Clause. In
certain factual situations, the government does the same thing twice
to a defendant, thus causing the situation to appear as superficially
implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause is not truly implicated unless the government twice puts
the defendant in jeopardy for the same offense; the text of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government from doing
anything else twice to a person. The Court has focused on the con-
cepts of "same" and "twice,"' 93 however, and therefore has had its
191. E.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969); United States v. Pungitore,
910 F.2d 1084, 1111-12 (3rd Cir. 1990).
192. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). In Blackledge, the defendant was con-
victed in a summary proceeding which, under North Carolina law, he had the option of by-
passing in favor of a full-fledged trial. North Carolina law also provided that if a defendant
was convicted in the summary proceeding, he had the right to a full-fledged trial de novo. In
effect, by exercising the right to a de novo trial, the convicted defendant could start over,
wiping the slate clean. The de novo trial, unlike the summary proceeding, provided a right to
trial by jury.
In Blackledge, the defendant elected to proceed in the summary proceedings, and was con-
victed. He exercised his right to a de novo trial. The prosecutor thereafter sought to bring
increased charges against the defendant, that is, charges that could result in greater punish-
ment than possibly could have been imposed for the charges brought in the summary proceed-
ing. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibited the prosecution from
increasing the charges in response to the defendant's election to exercise his right to appeal.
See id. at 28-29.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court's holding "surely sounds in the language
of double jeopardy, however it may be dressed in due process garb." Id. at 35 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
193. For example, in Ashe, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause embodied the
doctrine of collateral estoprpel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). The Court justi-
fied its holding on the grounds that criminal collateral estoppel "protects a man who has been
acquitted from having to 'run the gantlet' a second time." Id. at 446; id. at 465 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority's holding rested primarily on this language). In finding a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court was swayed by the fact that the defendant
had been subjected to something a second time. The Court, however, ignored the fact that
what the defendant was subjected to a second time was litigation of a single issue, not jeop-
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attention directed to the double jeopardy guarantee of not being
twice jeopardized for the same offense. As a result, it perceives the
issue to be one of double jeopardy, when in reality it is not, because
the defendant undeniably has not been twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. 9 By failing even to consider alternate bases for such
protection, the Supreme Court has implied that such protection
could exist only by virtue of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Therefore, although the Court has been aware of the existence of
due process arguments in situations arguably within the ambit of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court has not recognized the Due
Process Clause as a perfect shield against unfair successive prosecu-
tions. By relying on appearances instead of a disciplined analysis of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court has created much confusion.
Such confusion cannot be excused as necessary to achieve fair re-
sults, because, as argued below, the Due Process Clause is perfectly
capable of encompassing the rights the Court wished to create. Extra
protection against successive prosecutions- previously thought to be
solely within the domain of the Double Jeopardy Clause-fits per-
fectly within both the text of the Due Process Clause and case law
developed thereunder.
1. Due Process Protection Against Successive Prosecutions:
Substantive or Procedural?
In considering whether due process rights actually could encom-
pass the additional protection against successive prosecutions, one
must first determine whether to seek such protection under proce-
dural due process, substantive due process, or both.
As explained by one court, substantive due process focuses on
what the government has done, whereas procedural due process fo-
cuses on how and when the government did what it did.195 Under this
characterization, distinguishing between procedural due process and
substantive due process in successive prosecutions is somewhat
ardy for a same offense. In other words, the Court ignored the fact that by its terms, the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against "running the gantlet" a second time only when
"running the gantlet" translates into "being put in jeopardy for an offense"; to the extent
that a person can "run the gantlet" without being put in jeopardy for an offense, the Double
Jeopardy Clause should not protect against running the gantlet a second time.
194. In Ashe, for example, the Court's true concern was with defendants being forced to
twice "run the gantlet." See supra note 193 and accompanying text. However, insofar as
twice running the gantlet does not entail twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense, the
Court's concern in Ashe did not actually implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
195. Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1041
(1991).
19941
162 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:119
tricky. 9 For example, the protection created by Ashe could be char-
acterized as either procedural or substantive. Ashe can be described
as focusing on what the government cannot do-force a criminal de-
fendant to relitigate an issue on which the defendant previously pre-
vailed. On the other hand, Ashe also can be described as focusing on
when the government cannot do what it does; the government cannot
force a defendant to litigate an issue after the defendant has pre-
vailed on that issue.
A more exacting comparison of substantive and procedural due
process, however, reveals that only substantive due process could
provide the extra protection against successive prosecutions. Sub-
stantive due process prohibits governmental action against an indi-
vidual that would be unjustified even if taken in accordance with the
most stringent procedural safeguards. 97 In other words, the govern-
ment cannot take away substantive due process rights, no matter
what procedure it uses. 98 By contrast, procedural due process is a
safeguard against erroneous governmental conduct.'9 Thus, a lack
of procedures risking an erroneous deprivation of an individual's
protectable interest results in a procedural due process violation, but
such violation can be cured by additional procedures that sufficiently
lower the risk of error. 200 As this comparison indicates, procedural
due process violations are impermissible governmental acts correcta-
ble by the addition of adequate procedures, whereas substantive due
process violations are impermissible governmental acts that could
never be permissible, no matter what procedures are available.
Against this background, it is apparent that the particular govern-
ment act of unfair successive prosecutions could violate substantive,
but not procedural, due process. A criminal defendant seeking to
avoid a second prosecution after a prior prosecution does not desire
more procedures. 0' Rather, the defendant's objection is that he is
196. "Because the line dividing 'procedural due process' from 'substantive due process' is
not always clear, it may be difficult in some cases to determine which is the proper characteri-
zation of the plaintiff's claim." Madden v. City of Meriden, 602 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (D.
Conn. 1985).
197. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507
(11th Cir. 1987); Madden, 602 F. Supp. at 1166 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952)).
198. See Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (11 th Cir. 1987).
199. See Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1987).
200. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)(indicating that additional
procedures reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a protectable interest separate
procedural due process violations from nonviolations).
201. Cf. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1320 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied,
cert. granted sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 498 U.S. 1011, aff'd, Ill S. Ct. 1919
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subject to any procedures at all. The defendant's argument is that
the second prosecution is impermissible, regardless of the procedures
used either in the second prosecution or in deciding whether the sec-
ond prosecution is permissible. Because the defendant's argument
would be that he has a right (to avoid the second prosecution) that
the government cannot take away pursuant to any procedures, he
would be invoking substantive due process. 20 2
Put another way, a procedural due process violation occurs when
the government could deprive a person of a protectable interest un-
der constitutionally acceptable criteria, but fails to provide proce-
dures adequate for making a sufficiently accurate determination as
to whether the criteria actually apply to that person. A substantive
due process violation occurs when the government deprives a person
of a protectable interest, but under unconstitutional criteria.2 0 3 Un-
der this characterization also, a second prosecution could violate
only substantive due process. A procedural due process violation
would indicate that, although a second prosecution of a defendant
might be permissible under applicable criteria, the government has
not provided procedures adequate for determining if the second
prosecution satisfies the criteria. Of course, a defendant would not
make such an argument. Rather, the defendant's argument would be
that no constitutional criteria permit the second prosecution; in
other words, that the second prosecution violates substantive due
process.
2. Substantive Due Process Protection Against Unfair
Prosecutions
Although substantive due process is the only possible source of ad-
ditional protection under the Due Process Clause, it still must be de-
termined whether, in light of all relevant principles of due process, it
actually is an appropriate source of protection. The overriding prin-
ciple of substantive due process is that it prohibits the government
(1991). In Marshall, the defendants argued that the length of their sentences was excessive, in
violation of the Due Process Clause. In noting that the defendants' argument was an appeal to
substantive due process, the Court replied: "[Diefendants received ample 'process.' Their
complaint is about substance, not process." Id. at 1320.
In fact, extensive procedures generally are provided before a defendant can be deprived of a
liberty interest by being convicted and imprisoned pursuant to a criminal prosecution. Such
procedures include right to trial by jury, right to counsel, right to confront adverse witnesses,
right to present one's own witnesses, etc.
202. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794.
203. Thus, a substantive due process violation occurs irrespective of the procedures in-
volved. Even when the procedures available are so extensive that no doubt exists that under
the applicable criteria the person should be deprived of his or her interest, a substantive due
process violation exists if the criteria themselves are unconstitutional.
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from using its power oppressively.20 4 It has been stated-even more
broadly-that the linchpin of substantive due process is fairness. As
a result, the Supreme Court has held that substantive due process is
violated by governmental actions that offend Anglo-American can-
ons of decency, justice, and fairness; violate guarantees fundamen-
tally rooted in American tradition; or violate rights implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. 205 Alternatively, courts have stated more
simply, but no less vaguely, that substantive due process violations
occur when fundamental fairness is violated. 20 6 Finally, perhaps the
most graphic description is that a substantive due process violation
comprises governmental action that "shocks the conscience, ' 20 7 or
"shocks" one's universal sense of justice. 08
Clearly, the protection provided by substantive due process against
unfair governmental action in general applies to unfair successive
prosecutions in particular. The Court has held that a state's enforce-
ment of its criminal laws must comply with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.209 Thus, every prosecution-the
state's most important mechanism for enforcing its criminal laws-
must comply with the Due Process Clause.210 Applying a straightfor-
ward due process analysis is therefore appropriate to determine
whether successive prosecutions violate the Due Process Clause.
By its terms, the Due Process Clause protects individuals from be-
ing deprived of three things without due process of law: life, liberty,
and property.211 A criminal defendant has a liberty interest in being
free from reprosecution. 212 Having established that liberty interest,
204. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); see also Guntharp v. Cobb
County, 723 F. Supp. 771, 774 (N.D. Ga. 1989)(clarifying that the cited passage of Daniels
relates specifically to substantive due process).
205. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); see also Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
206. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Crist v. Lane, 745 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, Crist v. Lane, 471 U.S. 1068 (1985); cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of
Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981)(stating that due process "expresses the requirement
of 'fundamental fairness,' a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is
lofty"), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981).
207. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
208. United States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740, 743 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 916 (1987).
209. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 435 (1988).
210. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25 (1974); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d
1084, 1112 (3rd Cir. 1990) (examining successive prosecutions for compliance with substantive
due process); United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1985)(a prosecutor's
decision to reindict is limited by substantive due process).
211. See, e.g., Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 80 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1131 (1985).
212. "We believe A defendant has a liberty interest in being free from reprosecution in
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the next step in the due process inquiry is to determine what process
is due the holder of that interest, and whether the holder received
such process." 3
Thus, the Court could find that successive prosecutions violate a
defendant's right to substantive due process if there is some govern-
mental action that is strikingly unfair in light of fundamental princi-
ples of American justice. 21 4 In step three of the proposed
methodology, the Court would have the power to decide whether
successive prosecutions are so unfair that they violate the Due Proc-
ess Clause.
By creating extra protection against successive prosecutions in this
manner, the Court would avoid the functional obstacles created by
the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is easier to prohibit a
second prosecution on the subjective grounds of unfairness than to
prohibit it on the grounds that it would subject the defendant to a
second jeopardy for the same offense." 5 Indeed, most adopted or
suggested rules curbing successive prosecutions-Ashe and Grady,
for example-cannot be justified on the latter grounds.21 6
By contrast, those rules can be and always have been justified on
the former grounds. In fact, the justices consistently have justified
these rules not as being necessary to avoid twice putting a defendant
in jeopardy for the same offense, but rather as being necessary to
avoid subjecting a defendant to unfairness not acceptable under fun-
damental principles of American justice.
For example, to justify its holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause requires that a defendant receive the benefits of criminal col-
lateral estoppel, 21 7 the Ashe Court explained that criminal collateral
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause ... United States v. Delgado-Miranda, 951 F.2d
1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). A defendant obviously has a liberty interest in
avoiding a reprosecution, which might effect a prison sentence ending his or her liberty. Fur-
thermore, a defendant has the liberty interest no matter what kind of prosecution threatens it;
whether the prosecution would violate the Due Process Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, or
some other law, the defendant has the same desire to stay out of jail.
213. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874,
879 (6th Cir. 1986).
214. Courts consistently have stated that defendants are denied due process by govern-
mental actions that violate Anglo-American canons of decency, guarantees fundamentally
rooted in American tradition, and the like. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
215. Finding unfairness involves nothing more than making a subjective moral judgment
about the facts of the case. Finding two jeopardies for the same offense is more complicated.
It requires applying definitions of "jeopardy" and "same offense," then examining the inter-
relationship between the jeopardies and same offenses to determine whether the jeopardies
both are "for" the same offense.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 118-28.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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estoppel had existed in federal courts for more than fifty years and is
generally a bedrock principle of American justice.218 In addition,
rather than explain how criminal collateral estoppel protects the de-
fendant from a second jeopardy for the same offense, the Ashe
Court argued that its rule "protects a man who has been acquitted
from having to run the gantlet a second time. ' 21 9 Similarly, the
Grady Court justified its rule simply on the grounds that it was nec-
essary to prevent defendants from facing excessive burdens, harass-
ment and expense.220
There are two potential objections against using the Due Process
Clause, rather than the Double Jeopardy Clause, to support height-
ened protection against successive prosecutions. The first is that due
process standards are simply too vague, too unpredictable and too
subject to shifting political winds on the Supreme Court. 22' Undenia-
bly, the Due Process Clause is vague; intentionally so, in fact. 222
Moreover, the particular due process principles useful in successive
prosecutions may be particularly vague. 223 Until now, however, extra
protection against successive prosecutions has been created under
equally vague and politically motivated standards, 224 even though the
218. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
219. Id. at 446.
220. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990).
221. The creation of rights under substantive due process is often criticized on these
grounds. For example, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973), the Supreme Court relied on
substantive due process to strike down a Texas statute prohibiting abortions. In dissent,
Justice White wrote:
The Court apparently values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than the
continued existence and development of the life or potential life that she carries.
Whether or not I might agree with that marshaling of values, I can in no event join
the Court's judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for imposing such an
order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States. In a sensitive area
such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable men may easily and
heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power of choice by
interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and by
investing women and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to extermi-
nate it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to the
political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs.
Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
222. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981)(declaring that " 'due process' has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely de-
fined."), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72
(1952)(noting that reconciling continuity with a changing, progressive society renders a fixed
interpretation of the Due Process Clause impractical).
223. Under the proposed methodology, the Court would create due process rights against
successive prosecutions based on a completely subjective judgment as to what is fair. See sit-
pra text accompanying notes 214-15.
224. The Supreme Court's approach to creating double jeopardy rights has been strongly
shaped by individual justices' political philosophies regarding the use of governmental power.
See supra notes 49, 50, and 159 and accompanying text.
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Court has attempted to cloak such protection in the guise of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, by invoking the Due Process Clause
instead of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court would
not substitute vague standards for clear standards. Rather, the Court
likely would maintain equally vague standards, but would justify the
standards under a provision intended to spawn vague standards,
rather than under a provision that should not foster vagueness 25
Thus, by relying on the Due Process Clause instead of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Court would not sacrifice predictability, but
rather would attribute any unpredictability to the Due Process
Clause-where unpredictability is to be expected-instead of the
Double Jeopardy Clause-where unpredictability should not be ex-
pected.
The second possible objection is that, under settled law, substan-
tive due process is least applicable when accompanied by a specific
constitutional provision. 2 6 On closer analysis, however, this consti-
tutional truism is irrelevant here. A court would reach the substan-
tive due process test of step three only if the court made a prior
determination, in steps one and two, that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply to bar the successive prosecutions. A court
would apply substantive due process only to a second prosecution
that is not within the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause because it
does not put a defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same
offense. 2 1
Indeed, the Supreme Court and commentators have realized, al-
beit unwittingly, that successive prosecutions can implicate due proc-
ess more than the double jeopardy guarantee. In Ashe, the Court
stated that the question in the case was "whether, after a jury deter-
mined by its verdict that the petitioner was not one of the robbers,
the State could constitutionally hale him before a new jury to litigate
that issue again. ' 2 The Court's reference to the Constitution gener-
ally, rather than the Double Jeopardy Clause in particular, is sugges-
tive. Such reference revealed the Ashe Court's perception that the
actual issue is whether the relitigation violated the Constitution, not
225. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1320 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g de-
nied, cert. granted sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 498 U.S. 1011, aff'd, IlII S. Ct. 1919
(1991).
227. Under the proposed methodology, a second prosecution subjected to the substantive
due process analysis of step three could not be for the same offense as a first jeopardy. If it
were, then the second prosecution would have been barred under steps one and two of the
methodology, and the court never would have reached step three.
228. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970).
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whether the relitigation violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Com-
mentators also have stated that the ultimate question is whether suc-
cessive prosecutions violate the Constitution. 219
Such pronouncements reveal an implicit belief that successive pro-
secutions actually should be tested against more general constitu-
tional standards rather than against the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The source of these general constitutional standards undoubtedly
would be substantive due process, the Constitution's source of sub-
stantive rights in areas not specifically addressed by a provision in
the Constitution. 2
30
Thus, the Supreme Court and commentators unknowingly have
suggested substantive due process as a source of protection against
successive prosecutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Relative to many other constitutional provisions, the language of
the Double Jeopardy Clause is conducive to a structured methodo-
logical interpretation. Specifically, the text of the Double Jeopardy
Clause sets forth two prerequisites for double jeopardy protection in
a given case: multiple jeopardies and same offenses. The Clause also
prescribes the necessary relationship between those prerequisites;
that is, the multiple jeopardies must be for the same offense. On its
face, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause announces a multi-step
violation test. i
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has developed tests for double
jeopardy violations which depart drastically from the self-evident
multistep test. Particularly, in the successive-prosecution context, in
creating tests additional to Blockburger for double jeopardy viola-
tions, the Supreme Court has ignored the threshold issues of whether
the defendant's case involves two jeopardies and two same offenses.
The Court has completely overlooked the significance of the Clause's
requirement that both jeopardies be for rather than simply involve
229. See Thomas, In Search of a Definition, supra note 3, at 345 ("Therefore, as Justice
Brennan has argued, the required evidence [Blockburger] test may not satisfy the Constitution
in the context of successive prosecutions."); Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection, supra note
125, at 100 ("The question is, to what extent does the Constitution permit fragmentation of
prosecutions arising from a single course of criminal conduct?").
230. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (Stewart, J., concurring)("the 'liberty' protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms
explicitly named in the Bill ofRights") (emphasis added); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d
1312, 1320 (7th Cit. 1990)(noting that recognizing substantive due process rights is least ap-
propriate in areas in which there exist specific constitutional provisions), reh'g denied, cert.
granted sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 498 U.S. 1011, a/I'd, Ill S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
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the same offense. As a result, the Supreme Court's approach to suc-
cessive prosecutions is both unfaithful to the language of the Clause
and oblivious to the governmental concerns implicated in successive-
prosecution cases. Moreover, the Court's approach has resulted in a
haphazard collection of double jeopardy tests difficult for lower
courts to apply.
Some members of the Court have focused not on the Clause's self-
evident test, but rather on the capacity of successive prosecutions to
burden defendants unfairly. Thus, the Court has tended to create
protection against successive prosecutions according to either subjec-
tive notions of what is unfair, or perceptions of traditional American
notions of fairness. Arguably, criminal defendants should receive
such protection. However, the Court need not rely on vague stan-
dards of fairness, rather than the text of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, to explain why the Clause requires such protection. The mul-
tistep test itself is sufficiently flexible to allow the Court to expand
or contract double jeopardy rights against successive prosecutions
merely by expanding or contracting its definitions of "same of-
fense" and "jeopardy."
Arguably, the multistep test is not flexible enough to prevent all
unfair successive prosecutions, because some successive prosecutions
are unfair even if undeniably not for the same offense. For those,
however, the Due Process Clause is a perfect source of additional
protection against the oppressive governmental action of unfair suc-
cessive prosecutions. By invoking the Due Process Clause, rather
than the Double Jeopardy Clause, to achieve this purpose, the Court
would inject no more vagueness than already exists under the Due
Process Clause and would preserve the clear structure to which dou-
ble jeopardy analysis is so amenable.
Thus, the proposed methodology, comprising a two-step double
jeopardy inquiry with an additional due process inquiry in the suc-
cessive-prosecution context, would eliminate the problems evident in
the various approaches taken bythe Supreme Court justices. In con-
trast to those approaches, the proposed methodology offers fairness
to defendants, flexibility in defining the terms of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, consideration for the governmental prerogative in vin-
dicating different interests, and clarity to lower courts-all while
being faithful to the historically neglected language of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
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